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This study examines the productivity of Navy enlisted recruiters and makes 
recommendations for improving Production per Recruiter (PPR). Specifically, this 
research focuses on two areas. First, the study reviews the initial assignment and training 
process for recruiters. Typically this process, known as the “on-boarding process,” takes 
eight months after initial assignment to basic ENlisted Recruiter Orientation (ENRO). 
The study evaluates how that process might be shortened by altering when a recruiter 
reports to initial training. The analysis examines whether it is possible to increase 
individual productivity with minimal to no increase in cost to the Navy. Second, the study 
examines the differences in recruiter productivity across Navy enlisted ratings to see 
whether sailors in some ratings tend to perform better than those in other ratings, in an 
effort to maximize labor efficiency. The results of the study suggest that some of the 
ratings that require higher cognitive ability, based on Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) sub-scores, generally perform at a slightly higher level (PPR) 
than other ratings with lower cognitive ability requirements. Further research is 
recommended to fully quantify the cost of a rating screening process and understanding 
the differences in cognitive ability, the different cultures of each rating, and their 
correlation to recruiting performance. 
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Since the 1980s, the Navy’s enlisted Production per Recruiter (PPR)—the average 
number of enlisted contracts written or gained per month has changed substantially. From 
the highs of 2.4 new contracts per recruiter during the 1980s, PPR dropped to an average 
of 1.3 during the 1990s, and to only a 0.86 average PPR during the 2000s (J. L. Noble, 
personal communication, November 12, 2012). In response to those changes, the annual 
size of the enlisted recruiting force has fluctuated to meet the challenges of changing 
market conditions and annual goals. The decrease in PPR and the size of the overall 
recruiting force has been extensively researched over the past 20 years. While most of the 
studies have focused on either the overall decrease in PPR or the drop in productivity 
during the last half of an enlisted recruiter’s three-year tour, part of this study’s goal is to 
focus on ways of improving productivity during the recruiter’s first year. 
According to the latest 2010 Recruiter Quality of Life Survey from the Joint 
Advertising Market Research and Studies (JAMRS),  
The number of recruits per Active Duty recruiter for the Air Force in 2010 
was double that of any other service. In FY10, the number of recruits per 
Active Duty recruiter (based on the annual goal divided by the number of 
recruiters), was 12.5 for the Army, 8.3 for the Navy, 8.9 for the Marine 
Corps, and 24.2 for the Air Force. (JAMRS, 2010, p.1) 
In 2005, the Navy’s goal per number of recruiters was 9.4; in 2008, the number 
decreased to 9.2; and, in 2009, the number was 8.6 (JAMRS, 2010). During that same 
period, the Air Force increased its production from 13.0 to 24.2. The average PPR for 
enlisted Navy recruiting from 2008 to 2011, based on data collected for this study, 
equaled 0.76 PPR, or 9.12 new recruits per recruiter per year (J. L. Noble, personal 
communication, January 22, 2013). 
In a budget-constrained environment, efficient management of the Navy’s enlisted 
recruiter force has become increasingly important. Developing new strategies will allow 
the Navy to more readily adjust to changing market conditions in an effort to improve 
individual recruiter productivity. This study will extend prior research conducted on 
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enlisted Navy recruiter productivity by examining the initial assignment and training 
methodology for enlisted recruiters, known as the “on-boarding” process. This process 
includes the time it takes to train an enlisted recruiter before significant gains in 
productivity are noticed. The study examines how that on-boarding process might be 
shortened to allow more time for increased productivity during a recruiter’s tour. 
Furthermore, this study examines the differences in recruiter productivity across Navy 
enlisted ratings to see if Petty Officers in some ratings tend to perform better than those 
in other ratings. 
B. THE NAVY RECRUITING MISSION 
The mission of recruiting is to recruit men and women for enlisted, officer 
candidate, and officer status in the Regular and Reserve Components of 
the Navy. It is one of the most demanding billets in the Navy due to the 
pressures associated with a fast-paced sales environment. (Navy Personnel 
Command [NPC], 2012, para. 1) 
Navy enlisted on-production recruiters are primarily Petty Officers (E-5/E-6) who 
have completed at least one tour of duty. At the end of their tour in their primary rating, 
enlisted sailors are either recommended for recruiting duty or they can volunteer. The 
enlisted sailor must first contact their detailer when negotiating new orders. The first step 
of the process is taking the online Recruiter Assessment Battery (RAB). The assessment 
generally takes 30 minutes to complete and helps to determine the sailor’s likelihood of 
success in the challenging and fast-paced world of recruiting. “There is no pass or fail, 
and the probability of being a successful recruiter is based on the historical results of 
previous recruiters who have completed the assessment and a successful tour of 
recruiting” (NPC, 2012, para. 5). “Each rating is required to nominate a certain 
percentage of their rating population for recruiting each month” (NPC, 2012, para. 1). 
Not all ratings are eligible for recruiting duty, so for the purpose of this study, only 
sailors in those ratings that are eligible for recruiting duty will be analyzed. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, the study aims to evaluate the current 
“on-boarding” process. Specifically, the time it takes to train a fully qualified enlisted 
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production recruiter and their productivity during that six-to-eight-month time span. The 
author’s interest in this subject started when he was asked in February 2011, what he 
thought could be done to shorten the on-boarding process for both officer and  
enlisted recruiters. 
The average eight months of time spent training a fully qualified enlisted 
recruiter—from the time they report to their initial recruiter training to the time they pass 
their advance qualification boards—is significant. During the first four to six months, the 
average recruiter workload is primarily limited to working with applicants whose “kits” 
(necessary paperwork required for enlistment) were started by other, more experienced 
recruiters. Considering that six to eight months of a three-year tour is spent training and 
that, on average, the final six months are often spent turning over to his or her relief and 
getting prepared for their next set of orders, the average window for maximum 
productivity during a recruiting tour is only two years, according to interviews conducted. 
This study evaluates how that process might be shortened by altering when a recruiter 
first reports to initial training. The analysis determines whether it is possible to increase 
individual productivity during the on-boarding period with minimal to no increase in cost 
to the Navy. 
Second, this study analyzes the PPR and initial recruiter training test scores for 
Navy E-5 and E-6 ratings serving on active duty and whose rating has designated a 
percentage of their rating population for recruiting duty. Several studies have focused on 
the effect of cognitive ability on sales performance, but little research has been done on 
comparing the ratings’ minimum cognitive requirement to the recruiters’ average 
production. This study examines the differences in recruiter productivity across Navy 
enlisted ratings in an effort to determine if petty officers (E-5/E-6) in ratings that require 
higher cognitive ability, on average, perform better than those in ratings with lower 
cognitive ability. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research uses interviews conducted over a period of six months with current 
and former Chief Recruiters (CRs), Zone Supervisors (now known as Division Leading 
Chief Petty Officers [DLCPOs]), Recruiters in Charge (RINC, or now known as Station 
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Leading Petty Officers [LPOs] of individual recruiting stations), and instructors with the 
Navy Recruiting Orientation Unit (NORU). A secondary area of research uses data 
provided by NORU, and the Navy Recruiting Command (NRC). 
The primary research questions are: 
 Can NRC increase recruiter productivity by altering the on-boarding process 
from eight months to six months with minimal to no cost to  
the Navy? 
 Do certain enlisted ratings, based on Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) requirements, have a higher PPR than other enlisted ratings 
and what are the implications for getting more or fewer recruiters from certain 
ratings? 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of the thesis includes: (1) a review of NRC’s on-boarding process and 
training plans; (2) descriptive and statistical analysis using NORU and Personalized 
Recruiting for Immediate and Delayed Enlistment (PRIDE) data sets; (3) an analysis of 
recruiter productivity based on historical data; and (4) results analysis. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter II provides background 
information on Navy enlisted recruiting and a literature review of what is known to affect 
recruiter productivity. Chapter III describes the current on-boarding process and a 
recommended alternative that could shorten the process from eight months to six. 
Chapter IV includes a description of the data used in the second part of this study and 
presents the descriptive statistics. Chapter IV also looks at the differences in recruiter 
productivity across Navy enlisted ratings and what the implications are for getting more 
or fewer recruiters from certain ratings. Finally, Chapter V includes a summary of the 





The head of all Navy enlisted and officer recruiting is the Commander, NRC, 
located in Millington, TN. Recruiting goals and production are broken into two regions, 
East and West, which are led by a Commodore (Navy Captain), who reports directly to 
NRC. Each Region is divided into 13 Districts that maintain a geographical area of 
responsibility, and each District is commanded by a District Commanding Officer (CO) 
who usually holds the rank of Navy Commander. Navy Recruiting Districts (NRDs) 
report directly to their respective Regions. As shown in Figure 1, each NRD can cover an 
area that encompasses one or two states or a larger geographical area with multiple states 
and with a smaller per state population density. 
 
Figure 1. Navy Recruiting Regions and Districts  
(From http://www.cnrc.navy.mil/nrds.htm, 2013). 
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Each NRD has a CO at the top of their organization chart who is accountable to 
the Region Commodore for all enlisted and officer production. Figure 2 is an example of 
an NRD organizational chart. It is important to note that, effective in August 2011, the 
organizational structure changed and, for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to 
establish common terminology and areas of responsibilities. This study focuses on 
several roles within the NRD structure and some of the major changes that took place 
with regard to the organizational structure during 2011 to closely align the NRDs with a 
Fleet organizational structure. Not all roles and responsibilities will be covered, as some 
are irrelevant for the purposes of this study. 
 
Figure 2. NRD Organizational Chart  
(From NRC, 2011c, Chart XI). 
The NRD chain of command starts with the CO, who will usually take command 
for a period of 18 to 24 months. The CO’s function is to implement NRC and Navy 
Recruiting Region plans and policies throughout the NRD. Additional responsibilities 
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include developing and executing an operational plan that organizes NRD recruiting 
personnel to ensure that all goals and objectives are met or exceeded (NRC, 2011c). After 
a period of 18 to 24 months, the CO is then relieved by his or her Executive Officer (XO) 
who has been onboard for approximately the same period of time. This is known as 
“Fleet up” and the NRDs are commanded by a Navy Commander whose previous 
assignment was as the XO at the same command (NPC [XO] Fleet Up to Commanding 
Officer, 2003b). Some of the XO’s major responsibilities of the XO include serving as 
the command training officer, in which he or she will supervise and coordinate the work, 
exercises, training, and education of the command (NRC, 2011c). 
The Chief Recruiter (CR) position has witnessed some changes with regard to the 
new organizational structure. In addition to directly reporting to the CO, he or she now 
falls under the Recruiting Operations Officer (R-OPS). The function of the CR is to serve 
as the Recruiting Operations Department Leading Chief Petty Officer (LCPO), as well as 
executing the command training program for all production/processing personnel. Some 
of the LCPO’s major responsibilities also include conducting Daily Production Reviews 
(DPRs) with the R-OPS regarding the accomplishment of production plans and potential 
applicant leads disposition and follow up (NRC, 2011c). Reporting to the CR is the 
Officer Assistant Chief Recruiter (OACR) and the Enlisted Assistant Chief Recruiter 
(EACR). Like the CR, both Assistant Chief Recruiter (ACR) positions are nominated and 
selected by a board, with assignments approved by NRC (NRC, 2009). 
A major change that occurred during the 2011 reorganization was the elimination 
of the Officer and Enlisted Production Officer (OPO and EPO) positions. These roles had 
normally been filled by a Navy Lieutenant, but were combined to form the R-OPS 
position. The R-OPS billet is generally held by a Navy Lieutenant Commander who 
serves as Operations Department Head. They are responsible for ensuring the attainment 
of qualified applicants for commissioning or enlistment into the United States Navy 
through the supervision of assigned personnel and application of assigned resources. The 
Operations Department Head is responsible for the processing of all officer and enlisted 
applicants (NRC, 2011c). 
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Another major change is the creation of the Assistant Recruiting Operations 
Officer (A-OPS). Their primary function is to serve as the principal deputy to the 
Department Head for the Operations Department (NRC, 2011c). They assist in attaining 
qualified civilian applicants for commissioning or enlistment into the United States Navy 
through the supervision of assigned personnel. 
Due to the large geographical size of many NRDs, they are now broken down into 
more manageable areas called Divisions. Every Division will have an Officer Recruiter 
(OR) who serves as the Division Officer (DivO), and is normally a Navy Lieutenant. 
DivOs are responsible for attaining applicants to meet all Division goals. They ensure 
that the principles of diversity and equal opportunity are emphasized during the course of 
meeting daily mission objectives. DIVOs also have the additional responsibility of 
becoming qualified and being able to function as a production OR (NRC, 2011c). 
Recruiting tours for DIVOs last from 24 to 36 months (NPC, 2003a). 
Within each division, there is a Division Leading Chief Petty Officer (DLCPO), a 
position generally held by a Navy Chief or Navy Senior Chief who is a member of the 
Career Recruiting Force (CRF). They are in direct liaison with the OACR and the EACR. 
This is another example of the major reorganization that occurred in 2011. Prior to that, 
the district was broken down into Zones, with a Chief or Senior Chief Petty Officer 
serving as the Zone Supervisor. The responsibilities of the DLCPO include training, 
mentoring, and developing all Division personnel (NRC, 2011c). The DLCPO generally 
serves as a nonproduction recruiter and, according to Commander Navy Recruiting 
Command Instruction (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST) 5400.2E (2009), the position 
should be filled by Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS)-certified personnel who are 
either members of the Career Recruiter Force or Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 
9585, in pay grade E-7 or higher. 
Finally, in 2011, the reorganizational structure created the position of Station 
Leading Chief Petty Officer (LCPO)/Leading Petty Officer (LPO). Prior to the 
reorganization they were known as Recruiters in Charge (RINCs). Each LPO is 
responsible for their recruiting station and the position is normally held by a Navy Petty 
Officer First Class (E-6) who is a CRF; however, if the NRD is short of CRFs to fill those 
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positions, a Petty Officer First Class who is a Fleet sailor and non-CRF can fill that 
position (NRC, 2011d). Each station typically has from two to eight production 
recruiters; the station’s size determines how many production recruiters the LPO is 
ultimately responsible for. Their responsibilities include training, supervising, mentoring, 
and ensuring that all systems and resources are used to enlist sufficient numbers of 
qualified applicants to meet mission objectives (NRC, 2011c). 
According to Military Personnel Manual (MILSPERMAN) 1306-964, (2012), 
recruiting duty is considered “one of the most demanding billets” (p. 1) offered to 
enlisted sailors. In the 2010 Recruiter Quality of Life Survey conducted by JAMRS, the 
top three reasons for becoming a recruiter were: 55% of those recruiters surveyed felt that 
recruiting duty is career enhancing, 52% of respondents applied for recruiting duty to 
help young people, and 44% were able to choose the location of their duty station. To 
help attract the best and brightest sailors to apply for a tour of recruiting, the Navy 
Personnel Command highlights the following benefits on its web page: 
Recruiting can be very rewarding with plenty of incentives. How about 
recruiting in your hometown or close to the location of your choice? How 
about earning more money? Recruiting offers Special Duty Assignment 
Pay (SDAP) of $450.00 per month . . . that’s $5,400 extra a year! You 
may also be entitled to the use of a Government Vehicle, a Gas Card, a 
Cellular Phone, meritorious advancement (RCAP), Training (Sales Skills), 
and a Laptop Computer for use in your duties. 
RCAP (Recruiting Command Advancement Program) – At sea, the Navy 
has the CAP Program (Command Advancement Program). In recruiting, 
it’s the RCAP Program. Both are essentially the same. They are 
meritorious promotion opportunities, which are awarded to those 
individuals who go above and beyond the call of duty. To qualify for 
RCAP, you have to maintain superb, superior performance and be a top 
recruiter for your station. You can put on another Chevron for your hard 
work and dedication. 
Training (Sales Skills) – To become a recruiter, you will learn that 
Communication and Customer Service are major factors for successful 
Recruiting. We believe in the motto “the customer is always right”. In 
order to obtain these basic skills and others, we will send you to our 5 
week Recruiting School in sunny Pensacola, FL, upon transfer from your 
command. Upon graduation you will report to your district. Please 
reference MILPERSMAN 1306-964 for more information. 
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Recruiting gives you a chance to say that you have helped shape the future 
of the United States Navy. So, join the team and help make the world’s 
strongest military even stronger. (NPC. [2012, December 15]. 
Recruiting Duty. From http://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/enlisted 
/detailing/shorespecialprograms/recruiting/Pages/Recruiting%20Duty.asp) 
The SDAP of $450 per month is only available to enlisted recruiters, and only 
after they have completed their basic recruiter PQS. Recruiters may also request to recruit 
in their hometown and, depending on their performance, convert into the Career 
Recruiting Force (CRF). To apply for a transition into the CRF community requires a 
command endorsement and a review by an administrative board (NRC, 2009). Once 
converted into the CRF community, the enlisted sailor will spend the rest of their Navy 
career attached to NRC, will be assigned to various leadership- or administrative-type 
roles, and will cease to deploy. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW—WHAT IS KNOWN TO AFFECT RECRUITER 
PRODUCTIVITY 
There have been numerous recruiting studies conducted over the last 20 years; 
unfortunately, none of the previous studies focused on increasing productivity during the 
first year of an enlisted Navy recruiter’s three-year tour. Studies examined the effects of 
increasing the size of the recruiting force as a means to increase production; the effects of 
incentives on recruiter performance; variables or characteristics that predict recruiter 
performance; and how unemployment, adult influencers, and recent trends affect 
recruiting. Furthermore, studies have been conducted to evaluate the effects of Recruiter 
Refresher Training (RRT) offered half-way through a three-year recruiting tour as a 
means to increase production and increasing the length of a recruiting tour for those 
recruiters who really stand out among their peers. 
The recruiting environment is complex, and there are many factors that influence 
recruiter productivity, both internally and externally. Therefore, to understand enlisted 
Navy recruiting, it is important to understand what affects recruiter productivity and how 
that relates to a recruiter’s three-year tour. 
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1. The Inverted U and Productivity Effects 
Research conducted over the last 20 years has found that the productivity of the 
average Navy enlisted recruiter has varied over a three-year recruiting tour and can be 
categorized by different phases. Specifically, the relationship between productivity and 
months of recruiting experience was found to be characterized by an inverted, U-shaped 
curve: recruiters within their first six months upon check-in to their assigned Station had 
low, but rising, productivity; recruiters in the middle of their recruiting tour (from  
6 months through 30 months) had continuous high productivity, and recruiters nearing 
the ends of their tours had declining productivity (Samuelson, D., Kraus, A., Reese, D., & 
Moskowitz, M. 2006). 
Figure 3 illustrates the three different phases from data collected during  
1994–2002 for all first tour 9585 enlisted recruiters. Recruiters with the Navy Enlisted 
Classification code of 9585 are active duty sailors serving on shore duty as enlisted 
recruiters, then return back to the Fleet into their regular jobs. It is this specific type of 
recruiter that serves as the basis for this study. 
Although almost 20 years have elapsed from a previous 1988 study that identified 
the Inverted U, the Inverted U was found to still be present in the 2006 Center for Naval 
Analysis (CNA) study “Productivity Effects of Changes in the Size of the Enlisted 




Figure 3. FY94–FY02 Average New Contracts  
(From Samuelson et al., 2006). 
Phase 1 could be classified as the learning or on-boarding phase. Recruiters have 
a six-month learning curve after they have completed the ENRO course and have 
checked in with their new NRD. It is during this phase that Navy enlisted recruiters are in 
training and striving to consistently produce a minimum of one new net contract per 
month. It is Phase 1 that is the emphasis for this study. From interviews conducted with 
LPOs, DCLPOs, and former RINCs and Zone Supervisors, the greatest rise in 
productivity occurred between the fourth and sixth month, with an average PPR of 0.50. 
Phase 2 could be considered the high-productivity phase. It is during this phase 
when recruiters are expected to meet the minimum of one net contract (an individual 
accepted for enlistment) per month from six to 30 months of experience, with optimal 
peak productivity occurring between 12 and 18 months of experience (Samuelson et al., 
2006). It is during this phase that the CNA study (Samuelson et al., 2006) determined that 
yearly changes in force size could change force efficiency. According to Samuelson et al. 
(2006), “at the aggregate level, the number of net new contracts generated by a recruiter 
force of a given size will vary depending on the share of recruiters in each of the 
productivity phases” (p. 2). To test this, the authors estimated NRD contract production 
as a function of the market controls used in the individual recruiter-level model and the 
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number of recruiters in each of the three phases. They found that recruiters in the high-
production phase had significantly larger effects on overall enlisted production than those 
in Phase 1 or Phase 3 (Samuelson et al., 2006). 
Phase 3 could be considered the transitioning or helping phase. From Figure 3, it 
is the period between 24 and 36 months of recruiting that sees the most significant 
decline in production. From the interviews conducted, one conclusion for the steep 
decline in productivity during a recruiter’s final six months could be the result of the 
enlisted recruiter turning over to their relief, being pulled from production to assist new 
recruiters at their station, and/or focusing on their transition to their next duty station. 
This question was brought up during the interviews and was determined that it is fairly 
common to see a decline in productivity during the final six months of a recruiting 
tour based on transition/turnover. According to Samuelson et al. (2006) with regard to 
Phase 3: 
If it is an inherent part of the military rotation system, in which senior 
Sailors train junior Sailors and the line between the current assignment 
and the new assignment may be blurred, the inverted-U for recruiting 
might be considered both normal and desirable. In this case, it should be 
managed and accounted for in the planning process. In particular, planners 
should try to minimize fluctuations in the experience distribution in order 
to minimize fluctuations in force efficiency. (p. 69) 
The results of the Samuelson et al. (2006) study further determined that the 
changes in recruiting force size also affected productivity at the Station level. The data 
had shown that, between Fiscal Year (FY) 94 and FY02, the ratio of senior to junior 
recruiters varied significantly, thus complicating the efforts of assigning optimal 
experience mixes, and assigning recruiters to stations in high-productivity groupings. 
Furthermore, the study also found that the statistical results indicated that the experience 
levels of other recruiters in the station significantly affected the average recruiter 
production (Samuelson et al., 2006). This has remained a constant challenge to NRC, the 
NRDs, the LPOs, and the DLCPOs. As a result, the Projected Rotation Dates (PRDs) are 
closely monitored and managed in an effort to ensure that the recruiting Stations are 
manned with an equal mix of recruiters in their various phases of experience. 
Some of the recommendations included in the Samuelson et al. (2006) study are: 
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 Changing the Enlisted Goaling Model (EGM) to include the number of 
recruiters in high- and low-productivity phases. 
 Determining the feasibility of implementing changes to the size of the enlisted 
recruiter force by the extending of shortening tours. 
 Maximizing station-level productivity by carefully managing station-specific 
experience mixes. (p. 3) 
Furthermore, according to Samuelson et al. (2006), “Other interpretations of the 
inverted-U suggest considering policies designed to eliminate it” (p. 3). Their specific 
recommendations for eliminating or reducing the effect of the inverted U included: 
 Reevaluating recruiter management and testing to see whether the inverted U 
is an unintended consequence of the current incentive program ($450 per 
month is paid to every enlisted production recruiter regardless  
of productivity). 
 Considering the creation of a professional recruiting force that never rotates, 
either by increasing the size of the Career Recruiter Force (CRF) or by hiring 
civilian contractors. 
Another major productivity effect on PPR, as was briefly mentioned earlier, is the 
overall size of the enlisted recruiter force. As seen in Table 1, the New Contracts per 
Recruiter, called PPR, is determined by the New Contract Objective End Year/average 
number of production recruiters divided by 12 months. Every FY the new contract 
objective end year is never the same and has varied substantially, from 90,000+ during 
the 1980s, to its current low of 30,403 in FY11. Table 1 shows the average number of 
production recruiters varies from year to year in response to the size of the goal. Since 
2000, the Commander Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) objective of one net contract 
per month per recruiter has fallen below 1.0 PPR (J. L. Noble, personal communication, 








Table 1. CNRC Net Contracts by FY. 
 
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
New Contract  
     Objective End Year 35,809 39,125 31,729 34,111 30,403  
New Contract 
     Attainment 36,093 40,682 33,928 34,406 31,274 
Delta 284  1,557  2,199  295  871  
New Contracts 10.32 11.04 8.53 9.29 9.61 
Per Recruiter 0.86 0.92 0.71 0.77 0.80 
Avg. Adj. Unemployment 4.53 5.27 8.76 9.75 9.18 
Avg. Production Recruiters 3,496 3,685 3,978 3,702 3,254 
According to the interviews conducted, several stations were found to have a 
smaller monthly station goal than the total number of production recruiters. If a Station 
had four production enlisted recruiters, but is goal constrained with three contracts for 
that month, then the PPR would naturally fall below one. In addition, entry requirements 
have gone up considerably since the economic decline first experienced in 2008 as the 
Navy continued its drawdown. Most applicants accepted into today’s Navy are 
considered higher quality applicants (above 95%), who have scored a 50 or higher on 
their Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery ASVAB (Category IIIA and above). 
The interviews also found that fewer recruiters are processing applicants who require 
waivers, due to the lengthy time it can take for approval. 
There are several reasons for the decline in PPR since 1990. First, as the Navy 
shifted from a “fill” recruiting mission up to the latter part of the 1990s and early 2000s 
(qualified sailors to fill any position), to their more recent “fit” mentality (right person, 
right skill sets, in the right job), the recruiting environment has become increasingly 
difficult as the standards are raised. Whereas, although a “fill” mentality and lower 
ASVAB minimum netted more contracts per recruiter, in today’s high-demand,  
high-quality environment it may take a greater effort to identify, locate, and recruit 
higher-quality applicants, which results in a lower PPR. The lower PPR can further be 
compounded by the size of the recruiting labor force not keeping up or changing with the 
fluid and dynamic yearly adjustments to the enlisted recruiting goal. This trend has been 
apparent since 2000, but was reversed in FY12 when CNRC achieved a 1.06 PPR. This 
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may be the result of a risk adverse culture within CNRC (once the resources are gone, it 
is hard to get them back). 
According to Samuelson et al. (2006), the EGM “has remained largely unchanged 
for at least two decades, over which time the recruiting environment has changed 
substantially” (p. 14). This could also be another reason why the PPR has steadily 
decreased over the last 20 years. The EGM is the supply response to changes in the 
number of recruiters needed per given FY, based on the increases or decreases to the 
overall enlisted goal. “It is an econometric model that uses historical data on contract 
production to estimate the production impact of changes in the number of recruiters, 
holding constant external market conditions and the levels of other recruiting resources” 
(Samuelson et al., 2006, p. 8). In short, the EGM is used to estimate recruiter force 
efficiency. Figure 4 shows the official contracts per recruiter from FY 1990 through  
FY 2005. 
 
Figure 4. Official Contracts per Recruiter (From Samuelson et al., 2006). 
In their 2006 study, Samuelson et al. believed that changes in PPR may not have 
necessarily resulted from changes in recruiter force efficiency, although changes in 
recruiter force efficiency would cause changes in PPR. One reason for this may be due to 
production being goal-constrained because of end-strength limitations, such that if the 
recruiter force is larger than necessary, actual PPR will be underestimated and biased. 
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Therefore, CNRC may have adjusted their EGM going into FY12 to achieve the 1.06 
PPR in an effort to reverse the downward trend or allocated funding to another resource 
(more division commanders needed in boot camp). 
Finally, another study focused specifically on the previous rapid decline in 
productivity midway through the typical three-year recruiting tour and the effectiveness 
of offering a one-week Recruiter Refresher Training (RRT) course held at the Navy’s 
Recruit Training Command (RTC) in Great Lakes, Illinois. The study was conducted by 
CNRC in 1998, and the purpose was to evaluate the PPR of those who attended the one-
week course compared to those that did not in a controlled experiment (Soutter & Sladyk, 
1998). Eight hundred and six enlisted Navy recruiters attended the one-week refresher 
training course from June 1997 through February 1998. Of the attendees, 90% were E-5 
and E-6 Petty Officers. The average production time per recruiter was 15.9 months. On 
average, 90 enlisted recruiters attended RRT per month. The RRT allowed production 
recruiters firsthand experience with the changes made to “Boot Camp,” and a chance to 
exchange ideas with Recruit Division Commanders (RDCs). 
The methodology of the study included and was organized as follows (Soutter & 
Sladyk, 1998, p. 3): 
 Refreshed recruiters monthly PPR mapped to months before and after 
refresher training month 
 Refresher classes grouped together to determine overall refresher training 
effect 
 Control Group consisted of “on production” recruiters between 12 and 24 
month point in career 
 Refreshed recruiters average PPR compared to the average control group PPR 
for before and after training months 
 Two-sample t-tests for equal but unknown variances used to determine 
statistical significance 
The results of the study showed that those recruiters who attended RRT produced 
a significant increase in gross net contract productivity for the first six months following 
their refresher training. The study estimated that an increase of 871 new net contracts 
from June 1997 through March 1998 was attributable to RRT. Table 2 shows the 
comparisons between the control and refreshed group who attended the course. The RRT 
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course was soon implemented nationwide. However, in 2003, the one-week course was 
cancelled due to budgetary constraints (J. L. Noble, personal communication, November 
12, 2012). 
Table 2. Comparison of Gross New Contract Attainment Production per Recruiter 
(From Soutter & Sladyk, 1998). 
Months After 
Training 
Gross NCA PPR 
Refreshed Control Delta % 
0 1.40 1.34 0.06 4.4 
1-4 1.53 1.28 0.25 19.4 
5-8 1.39 1.26 0.13 10.4 
2. Predictors of Success 
Another factor that has gained interest with the Navy is the relationship between 
various predictors to sales and recruiting performance. Several studies have focused on 
the sales relationship, because sales content in the civilian sector is considered very 
similar to the same content used in Navy enlisted recruiting. The links between aptitude, 
personality, behavior, and sales and recruiting performance were discussed in Borman, 
Toquam, and Rosse (1979); Penny, Horgen, and Borman (2007); Bearden and Fedak 
(2000); and McCloy, Hogan, Diaz, Medsker, Simonson, and Collins (2001). 
Borman et al. (1979) conducted an initial study and identified five critical 
predictors for recruiting performance: Selling Skills, Administration Skills, Human 
Relations Skills, Performance, and Production. To validate their findings, a second study 
was implemented using the five critical predictors. Sample sizes of 267 enlisted recruiters 
from ten NRDs were selected. The results of their study confirmed that the five critical 
predictors were strong indicators of recruiting success. 
It was in 2007 that Penny et al. conducted a similar study in an effort to update 
and validate the earlier findings. Initially, the study focused on 134 recruiters who had 
taken what is called the Recruiter Assessment Battery (RAB), and analyzed their 
supervisory evaluations and production data. Penney et al. (2007) found the highest 
correlations were between selling skills and production (0.61), human relations skills and 
production (0.33), and organizing skills and production (0.23). To verify these results, the 
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RAB was administered to 254 enlisted Navy recruiters in three separate NRDs. No peer 
evaluations were used in the second study. Table 3 displays the results of the Penny et al. 
(2007) study. Similar to the initial results, significant correlation was found between 
selling skills and production. Human relations skills and production were still significant, 
but the correlation was not as strong. “It is apparent that selling skills are critical to the 
success of recruiters” (Penny et al., 2007). 
Table 3. Correlations between Criterion Measures 
(From Penny et al., 2007). 
 
Bearden and Fedak (2000) have summarized research evaluating the use of 
personality, interest, and biographical measures as predictors of recruiter performance. 
Their review of previous studies indicates that these types of measures have been found 
to be significantly correlated to recruiter performance and should be used for a RAB. One 
such study developed an empirically keyed Recruiter Interest Scale as a potential tool for 
selecting Navy recruiters (Bearden et al., 2000). Bearden and Fedak (2000) analyzed the 
results from the Borman et al. (1979) study and noted that the estimated cross-validations 
for the predictor battery against four of five performance criteria were statistically 
significant (p<0.01) and impressive. 
As a result of previous studies, NRC and Navy Personnel Command have 
implemented a RAB that every potential enlisted Navy recruiter must take. Because there 
is no pass or fail, however, one can argue that it is not as effective as it could be if used as 
a screening tool. According to some of the interviews conducted, the RAB is not used as 
a screening tool due to strong concerns caused by shrinking the pool of potential 
recruiters and not meeting manning requirements. 
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3. ASVAB Use in Recruiter Selection 
Various factors have made it more difficult for the Navy enlisted recruiters to 
meet their goals. These factors include: youth propensity to seek college education rather 
than serving in the military, a steady decline of adult influencers who had previously 
served in the military, and a rise in the number of Americans who are now considered 
either overweight or obese. 
In 2001, Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST) contracted 
with the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) and the Lewin Group to 
determine if ASVAB scores and recruiter training success could predict individual 
recruiter productivity and to evaluate the cost effectiveness of implementing recruiter 
selection methods using those and other variables. An analysis by McCloy et al. (2001) 
controlled for factors that could affect recruiting productivity, such as youth population, 
number of high schools in the vicinity of a recruiting station, and characteristics of the 
Navy Recruiting Station (NRS). Their literature review and background revealed that 
some recruiters had higher productivity than others in the same service. Such differences 
in productivity may be related to recruiter characteristics that could be used to screen 
recruiters, and recruiters could be selected based on characteristics that are related to 
productivity. Furthermore, McCloy et al. (2001) hoped to show that if a screening process 
were implemented, then the average productivity of the recruiting force would increase 
and the same recruiting goals could be met with fewer recruiters. The results of the 
McCloy et al. (2001) study indicated that neither ASVAB nor recruiter school 
performance were able to contribute much to the prediction of recruiter quality or 
recruiter productivity. 
The second part of this study further refines the 2001 study in an attempt to 
analyze the variation in recruiter PPR by including ASVAB sub-scores based on specific 
ratings. Specifically, the study examines the relationship between ASVAB sub-scores and 
initial recruiter training, the relationship between ASVAB sub-scores and rating-specific 
PPR, and how the results may be used to increase the average productivity of the enlisted 
recruiting force to meet NRC annual goals with fewer recruiters. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The recruiting environment is very dynamic and complex, and recruiters are 
challenged every day to overcome internal and external factors that directly impact their 
productivity. This section of the study focused on the overall structure of Navy enlisted 
recruiting and on previous studies conducted that have shown what affects recruiter 
productivity. Chapter III of this study describes the current on-boarding process, and an 
alternative that could shorten the process from eight months to six. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE ON-BOARDING PROCESS 
This chapter examines and analyzes the typical time that it takes for a Fleet sailor 
assigned to recruiting duty to master the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to 
achieve increased productivity and successful completion of the Advance Recruiter 
Module with a focus on the active enlisted Navy recruiter. This study does not focus on 
Canvasser Recruiters (CANRECs) who are Navy Reservists recalled to active duty for 
between two and five years. Topics discussed include the current on-boarding process, 
the length of the on-boarding process, problems associated with the current training 
pipeline, and an alternative on-boarding process. 
A. CURRENT ON-BOARDING PROCESS 
This section of the study examines the current on-boarding process and the steps 
involved from the time a Fleet sailor receives orders for recruiting duty through their 
becoming fully PQS qualified. 
1. Initial Recruiter Training 
Figure 5 displays the current on-boarding process. The first step begins with the 
E-5 or E-6 sailor negotiating orders with their detailer. Assuming that the individual has 
been successfully screened for enlisted recruiting duty, the detailer will reserve a seat for 
the five-week-long ENlisted Recruiting Orientation (ENRO) and will issue Permanent 
Change of Station (PCS) orders while assigned as Temporary Duty under Instruction 
(TEMDUINS). After successful completion of the ENRO course, the enlisted recruiter 
will complete a PCS move assigning them to a specific NRD and Zone (geographical 
area within the NRD). Where the sailor ultimately spends their 36-month recruiting tour 
is based on available openings at the NRDs and specific Zones within the NRD. The 




Figure 5. Average Eight-month Training Flow from the Time a New Fleet Recruiter 
Reports for Initial Training through the Recruiter Qualification Board. 
Once the new recruiter reports to the Navy Recruiting Orientation Unit (NORU) 
for the five-week-long ENRO course, their formal training has begun. The ENRO 
syllabus was revised in 2012 and is broken down into four modules. The four modules 
are: Indoctrination Week, Module-1 Prospecting, Module-2 VALOR (sales 
methodology), Module-3 Recruiter Resources, and Module-4 Capstone Sales Labs. 
NORU is no longer teaching the “Achieve Global Sales” module, which is taught 
during the second week, but has added a Navy-specific sales methodology called Value 
Oriented Recruiting (VALOR). Whereas Achieve Global Sales was considered universal 
and has been adopted by numerous sales organizations, the Navy chose to partner with 
VALOR to create a module that was custom-tailored for Navy recruiting. This study 
collected observations and conducted interviews based on the old training package. After 
reviewing both syllabuses, it appears that the basic sales concepts are included in both 
packages. The VALOR system was initiated in the summer of 2012. 
Another major change that CNRC implemented was moving away from a paper-
based system to one that relied more on computer-aided tools, both at the Station level 
and during initial recruiter training. This included a full restructuring of the ENRO 
syllabus. A full class schedule of ENRO is included as Appendix A. 
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Week 1 of recruiter training covers everything from financial awareness, how to 
effectively listen, stress control, fitness and nutrition, and an American Automobile 
Association (AAA) Drivers Course, to qualities that Navy recruiters possess. 
By Modules 2 through 4 of their initial training, new recruiters have received a 
taste of the sales world. Module 1 discusses topics such as prospecting for new 
applicants, market analysis, the Navy brand, and an introduction to social media used for 
recruiting. Module 2 discusses the VALOR Sales Methodology, Module 3 introduces the 
students to the various manuals and instructions used in recruiting, and Module 4 
includes coaching, more VALOR sales techniques, capstone sales labs, and ethics 
training. It is during these four weeks that the building blocks for success are introduced, 
as most of the new enlisted recruiters have never been exposed to sales training. VALOR 
is introduced during the third week (Module 2) when the students are taught about trends 
in sales and marketplaces, the art and science of sales, how to prospect for new 
applicants, understanding their prospects, the problems and pressures of their applicants, 
how to handle objections and uncertainty, role playing, and various other sales 
laboratories (NORU, 2012). 
After the students have successfully completed the five-week initial training 
course, they report to their NRD for a three-year recruiting tour and are given up to  
30 days’ leave. The leave period is used to relocate their families, set up their new 
household, enroll their children in school, and, for those who are not married, it gives 
them a chance to “breathe.” According to NORU instructors who were interviewed, most 
of the students will choose to take the full 30 days’ leave. The amount of leave they can 
take is determined by how many days of leave they have accumulated and the distance 
traveled to relocate. The sailor is not charged for travel days from their point of origin (a 
ship in the Fleet) to their destination (NRD). 
2. NRD Indoctrination 
Once the new enlisted recruiters have completed their leave, they report to their 
respective NRD and Station for recruiter indoctrination/Basic Recruiter Module (BRM) 
PQS. The indoctrination includes an introduction to the various departments of the NRD, 
a production brief, a meeting with their LCPO and LPO, DivO expectations, officer 
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programs, Navy Operational Support Center (NOSC) introduction, introduction to the 
various publications used in recruiting, access to various websites and computer-aided 
tools, physical training requirements, and being issued certain equipment essential for 
recruiting. The basic PQS qualifications and indoctrination must be completed within 45 
days of reporting (NRC, 2011d). Appendix B provides the complete Basic 
Recruiter/BRM PQS. 
After completing the indoctrination, and once the BRM PQS qualifications have 
been signed off, the recruiter then earns his/her Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP) of 
$450 per month. Most recruiters are incentivized to complete indoctrination/BRM PQS 
early and were found to have completed this in approximately 30 days. Within the next 
45 days, the NRD will hold a Recruiter Development Board (RDB) . . .  
to check on their progress since graduation from the ENRO course, 
determine their progress towards Advance Recruiter PQS completion, 
identify areas where the recruiter may need additional training and 
assistance, and discussing any personal/professional issues that may 
hinder their development. (NRC, 2009, p. 1-31) 
At any time after the successful completion of the BRM PQS, recruiters may 
work with applicants whose paperwork has been started by another, more experienced 
recruiter or applicants that they have prospected themselves. According to the interviews, 
the first six months of experience is considered the learning curve and recruiter 
productivity during this phase is low, averaging two to three contracts. Working with 
other, more experienced recruiters is fairly common and is considered part of the 
developmental process. The majority of enlisted recruiters will have signed contracts 
during the first six months; however, CNRC does not keep track of signed contracts that 
may have been started by a more experienced recruiter and turned over to a new recruiter. 
Therefore, the left part of the inverted U-shaped recruiting curve (Phase 1) is natural and 
the goal should be to minimize the time it takes for optimal productivity. 
3. Advance Recruiter PQS 
After completion of BRM PQS, the recruiter is given 4.5 months (or six months 
from their reporting date) to complete Advance Recruiter PQS. From a sales standpoint, 
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the advanced PQS is considered the most basic qualifications that an enlisted recruiter 
must complete during their 36-month recruiting tour. Other additional qualifications are 
available for those seeking LPO or LCPO positions. Once the advanced PQS has been 
signed off by the appropriate signing authority, an oral Recruiter Qualification Board 
(RQB) is scheduled to ensure that the recruiter can recite or provide knowledge about a 
certain program or required task (NRC, 2011d). A recruiter is considered completely 
qualified after the successful passing of the board (NRC, 2011d). Appendix C provides 
the complete Advance Recruiter PQS. 
4. Problems Associated with the Current On-Boarding Process 
 One of the goals of the interview process was to understand the current on-
boarding process and identify any weaknesses. For this study, 26 current or previous 
serving LPOs (formerly known as RINCs), five current ENRO instructors, 12 current or 
previous serving LCPOs (formerly known as Zone Supervisors), and two current or 
previous serving CRs were interviewed. The interviews were conducted in person when 
possible and took place over a six-month period. During the interviews, several areas 
were identified that had contributed to a longer training or on-boarding process. 
 During the interview process, it was discovered that an overwhelming number of 
individuals voiced the same concerns with the current on-boarding process. First, when 
asked if most new recruiters who had graduated from the ENRO course had taken the full 
30 days’ leave prior to reporting, the answer was “yes.” The interviewees were asked: 
“after reporting to their NRD and being assigned to a Navy Recruiting Station, on 
average, how long before the new recruiter had a chance to recall and demonstrate the 
basic recruiting/sales skills they had learned in Module 2 of their five-week ENRO 
course?” Approximately 80% answered 10 to 12 weeks to recall and demonstrate the 
basic recruiting/sales skills. The respondents indicated that this was due to new recruiters 
taking the full 30 days’ leave prior to check-in and 30 to 45 days to complete 
indoctrination/BRM PQS. Approximately 87% of those interviewed stated that most new 
recruiters had to relearn basic skills taught at NORU, which was due to the length of time 
between learning and applying those skills or data dumping after graduation. 
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The interviewees were asked how long it took for a new recruiter who had 
completed the basic recruiter PQS before they were experienced enough to prospect on 
their own, sell an applicant on joining the Navy on their own, handle concerns and 
objections from applicants, and complete the necessary paperwork to process the 
applicant on their own. The answer varied between four and six months since NRD 
check-in and that most of the contracts written during that time period were the result of 
the transition phase of a more experienced recruiter working with a new recruiter. The 
average number of contracts written between NRD check-in and six months was found to 
be three, or 0.50 PPR. 
Another problem identified with the current on-boarding process is the actual 
amount of time (eight months) spent in a training status until the recruiter is considered 
fully qualified. The lengthy training and on-boarding process may work in the civilian 
sector for an employee that the company has invested money and time in training, with 
the expectation that the employee will show a long-term commitment in that position. In 
the military recruiting world, however, where a sailor’s primary responsibility for three 
years is producing contracts, six to eight months spent on-boarding has resulted in fewer 
contracts written, as found in the inverted U. In a typical three-year tour, due to the 
amount of time for on-boarding and end-of-tour transition, this has resulted in only two 
years of “maximum productivity.” 
Lastly, approximately 87% of those interviewed stated that most new recruiters 
had to relearn basic skills taught at NORU, which was due to the length of time between 
learning and applying those skills, or data dumping, after graduation. Data dumping, or 
simply not being able to recall processes, skills, or previously taught training, was found 
to be significant for new recruiters who had completed the ENRO training, taken the full 
30 days’ leave, and then taken up to 45 days to complete the basic indoctrination/BRM 
PQS. There are several possible reasons for this. First, according to the interviews, a 
majority of those who were married were focused on family needs (e.g., moving their 
families and getting their families settled in). Second, too much time had elapsed to apply 
even the most basic of sales concepts (10 to 12 weeks). This is understandable, as most of 
the enlisted recruiters have never been exposed to recruiting or sales. Judging from the 
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ENRO curriculum and speaking with the ENRO instructors, the course itself may be 
basic, but for someone new to sales and recruiting the experience can be overwhelming. 
This is referred to as the “fire hose effect.” Thus, after graduating from ENRO and then 
having to recall those basic sales skills when working towards their Advance Recruiter 
PQS, a majority of the LPOs stated that the new recruiters would data dump or simply 
could not remember the basic fundamentals of sales methodology. 
The process of data dumping, or not being able to recall basic sales skills, is 
inefficient, costs recruiters extra time that is needed to relearn the basic sales 
methodology, and takes away from learning more advanced recruiter/sales concepts. If 
the recruiter has to relearn those basic concepts that are taught at ENRO, the recruiter is 
then unable to proceed to apply those skills to prospect for new applicants. A direct 
benefit to minimizing the effects of data dumping or skill decay could lead to a net 
increase in PPR by shortening the training process. While it is difficult to measure the 
costs associated with lost productivity as a result of data dumping, or having to relearn 
the basic fundamentals of recruiting/sales, the interviewees made it clear that this is 
something they would like to see minimized. 
B. AN ALTERNATIVE ON-BOARDING PROCESS 
This section of the study provides an alternative on-boarding process. It is an 
alternative that can reduce the total time required to obtain Advance Recruiter 
qualifications, and minimize skill decay or data dumping. What is unknown is what 
impact, if any, it would have on the effects of the left part of the inverted U-shaped PPR 
curve and recruiter productivity. For example, this would depend on the size of the 
recruiter force versus the annual NRC goal. 
1. The Process Steps 
As an alternative to the current on-boarding process, the Fleet sailor would 
continue the first step towards recruiting duty by either being recommended or 
volunteering. The Fleet sailor would continue the process by speaking to their detailer, 
taking the on-line RAB, obtaining command endorsement, meeting all screening 
requirements, and submitting their application for recruiting duty. 
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Figure 6 shows the proposed alternative on-boarding process. If the Fleet sailor is 
accepted for recruiting duty, they would first report to their NRD and be assigned to a 
specific Station. NPC would issue PCS orders assigning the Fleet sailor to a specific 
NRD. Once assigned to the specific NRD, it would be up to the discretion of the NRD 
CO to assign the Fleet sailor to a specific Station. The Fleet sailor’s detailer could 
continue working with NORU to reserve a school seat assignment for the five-week 
ENRO course. The Navy enlisted detailers have a copy of the ENRO course schedule 
(new classes are offered every week) for the FY. Scheduling and timing of the five-week 
ENRO course would be based on 60-75 days out from the PCS detach date and would be 
dependent on several factors: 
 ENRO seat availability 
 Projected Rotation Date (PRD) of the Fleet sailor 
 Up to 30 days’ leave built into the detaching and reporting date  
PCS orders 
 A requirement of 30-45 days for the Fleet sailor to complete NRD 
indoctrination/BRM PQS (which the recruiter would have to complete prior to 
attending the ENRO course) 
 PRD could be extended or adjusted, as previously done, to accommodate 
ENRO seat availability 
 
Figure 6. Average Six-month Training Flow from the Time a New Fleet Recruiter 
Reports to Their NRD through the Recruiter Qualification Board. 
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Once the Fleet sailor has been assigned PCS orders, it is recommended to notify 
both NORU and the prospective NRD CO via email when the recruiter will be reporting 
and the start date for ENRO. Once the Fleet sailor reports to the NRD, it becomes the 
responsibility of the NRD to ensure that the Fleet sailor completes their 
indoctrination/BRM PQS within 30 days prior to attending the ENRO course. For those 
not able to complete BRM PQS requirements prior to attending NORU, they should be 
allowed to finish upon return. If BRM PQS is changed to 30 days, this would require a 
change to COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1400.4P stating that new recruiters will first 
report to the NRD, complete basic PQS within 30 days, and be issued Temporary 
Assigned Duty (TAD) orders reporting to NORU. 
During the Recruiter indoctrination, the next step would involve assigning TAD 
orders for the new recruiter to report to NORU for the five-week ENRO course, based on 
their assigned “report by” date. A major concern, and a point of contention with the 
NRDs, will be funding, and having to ensure completion of indoctrination/BRM PQS 
within 30 days of check-in. As it stands now, the NRDs are not budgeted for, nor do they 
have the funding to send every new recruiter TAD to NORU. The current process 
involves NPC completely funding PCS orders in a TEMDUINS status first to NORU, 
then completing a PCS move to the NRD. It is recommended to either allow the NRDs to 
write the TAD orders using the same funding code that is currently assigned or for NPC 
to transfer funding to an NRC account for the Per Diem and TAD costs. In regards to 
completion of BRM PQS within 30 days, according to those interviewed, a majority of 
new recruiters complete BRM PQS within 30 days to start drawing the $450 per month 
SDAP. 
After the TAD orders have been written and paid for by NPC or funds transferred 
to an NRC account, the new recruiter would fly or drive round trip to NORU for their 
course of instruction. Cost differences will be discussed below. Once the new recruiter 
has successfully completed ENRO, they will graduate and be awarded their recruiter 
badge. Another policy change would involve when the recruiter starts to receive their 
SDAP. Under the current policy, the enlisted recruiter starts receiving SDAP after they 
have successfully completed NRD indoctrination/BRM PQS. This generally happens 
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after 95 days, or 13.5 weeks, from the time the Fleet sailor reports to NORU (5 weeks 
ENRO; 4 weeks leave; and 4.5 weeks, on average, to complete indoctrination) or 15.7 
weeks if the recruiter uses the full 45 days to complete basic PQS. Under the 
recommended alternative, the recruiter would start drawing SDAP after successful 
completion of the ENRO course at 95 days or 13.5 weeks (no cost difference). This 
assumes that the recruiter has taken 30 days’ PCS leave, 30 days to complete 
indoctrination, and 35 days to complete ENRO. For those recruiters who were not able to 
complete NRD indoctrination/BRM PQS prior to reporting to NORU, they would draw 
SDAP after completion of those requirements. 
Once the recruiter has graduated from ENRO, they would fly or drive back to 
their NRD to begin Advance Recruiter PQS. Within 45 days of reporting back to their 
assigned NRD, the recruiter, per COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1400.4P, would be 
scheduled for their RDB. Advance Recruiter PQS qualifications would start immediately 
after reporting back to their NRD and could be completed within four months versus the 
current six months allowed, based on the interviews conducted and having completed 
BRM PQS requirements without having to relearn basic skills taught at NORU. The  
two-month savings is due to altering when PCS leave can be taken; eliminating or 
reducing skill decay/data dumping; minimizing distractions with their family, as they 
should have had plenty of time to settle in; and sales concepts being fresh in their minds, 
having just graduated from ENRO. There is no longer a lapse of 75-90 days between 
when they took Modules 2 and 3 and when they start working on their Advance Recruiter 
PQS, which is presently the case and was found to be problematic during the  
interview process. 
a. Evaluating NPC’s New Policy 
Several months after the interviews for this study had been conducted, 
NPC adopted a new policy requiring new enlisted recruiter’s to take their 30 days’ PCS 
leave prior to reporting to NORU. This new policy seems to be the easiest solution in 
reducing skill decay and data dumping, as well as shortening the current on-boarding 
process from eight months to six. NPC would not have to reallocate funds to an NRC 
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account or be concerned about providing funding codes to the NRDs, who would have to 
fund the TAD orders to NORU under the author’s proposed alternative. On the surface, 
requesting sailors to first complete a PCS move before a five-week course may seem to 
be a trouble-free solution; however, the new policy may have its drawbacks. 
First, during the interview process, it was discovered that approximately 
75% chose to PCS after completing NORU. Of the 25% that chose to PCS prior to 
reporting to NORU, a majority of those recruiters were single. Under the new policy the 
Navy is requiring a new recruiter, who may be married, to move his family across the 
country within 30 days, and then immediately drive or fly across the country to attend the 
five-week ENRO course. According to the interviews, it was the added stress of moving a 
family across the country, and then ensuring they reported on time to NORU, that 
detracted from new recruiters completing their PCS move prior to reporting to NORU. In 
addition to moving, families now have to leave the familiarity of an established support 
network behind. Under the alternative on-boarding process, the new recruiter would 
remain with their family for approximately 30 days after completing the PCS to help 
transition with the move, while the new recruiter is completing the NRD indoctrination. 
Another advantage in having sailors report to the NRDs prior to attending 
the ENRO course, based on the interviews conducted, was the sense of familiarity with a 
new organization prior to reporting to NORU. For those enlisted Navy Reserve sailors 
who are recalled to active duty under the CANREC program, they receive PCS orders 
and are directed to report their NRD. Once at the NRD, the CANREC recruiter begins 
indoctrination/ BRM PQS requirements. The CANREC recruiter may be at the NRD for 
one to three months before receiving TAD orders to NORU. This allows the recruiter to 
become familiar with the various departments of the NRD, familiarize themselves with 
the manuals and computer systems used, shadow other recruiters, and have a basic 
understanding of their new job. It is the same approach that is found in most sales-related 
organizations (indoctrination first followed by training). By the time the new recruiter 
starts ENRO training, they may have been exposed to some of the basic principles taught 
in the course, terminology, and a fundamental understanding of what recruiting is  
all about. 
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2. Benefits and Cost Comparison 
According to several interviews, under the current training process a recruiter is 
issued PCS orders in a TEMDUINS status. MILPERSMAN 1306-606, 2007, p. 1, defines 
TEMDUINS orders as: “Members who are assigned quotas to course(s) of instruction of 
less than 20 weeks duration in connection with a permanent change of station (PCS) and 
are assigned to their ultimate permanent duty station upon completion of schooling.” 
Upon receipt of orders, the NRD is required to forward an Ultimate Duty Assignment 
message to the sailor’s command, with a copy to NORU, within 30 days. The sailor will 
execute transfer to NORU under TEMDUINS orders for five weeks. Upon graduation 
and leave, the sailor reports to their assigned NRD. The PCS cost per potential recruiter is 
approximately $12,000 (J. L. Noble, personal communication, November 12, 2012) and 
includes the Navy average PCS cost of $4,500 plus $7,500 to cover per diem, one-way 
travel, and lodging. 
Under the proposed system, the anticipated PCS and TAD cost per potential 
recruiter would be $600 more than it currently costs to send a recruiter to NORU first 
under PCS orders in a TEMDUINS status ($8,100 versus $7,500). The estimated cost 
increase of $600 is based on 8% of the total TEMDUINS cost of $7,500 that includes 
approximately $600 for one-way travel versus two-way travel. Rather than NPC issuing 
TEMDUINS orders to NORU, PCS orders would be issued to the recruiter’s assigned 
NRD, then requiring the NRD to issue (not fund) TAD orders to NORU. The challenge 
and difficulty rests with funding issues. As stated before, the NRDs do not have the 
money to send new recruiters TAD to NORU, so either the funds would have to be 
reallocated from NPC to an NRC account or a specific funding code assigned that would 
not come out of the NRDs’ budgets. As previously stated, the cost of the SDAP would 
remain the same, as both scenarios show that the average time when the recruiter first 
draws SDAP is approximately 95 days. 
The author believes the possibility for the $600 recruiter cost increase could be 
offset by the gains in increased productivity, which would reduce the number of 
recruiters needed. For example, the average PPR from 2007 through 2011 was 0.76, or 
9.12 net contracts per year per enlisted recruiter. Using the same requirements 
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determination and funding costs from OPNAV N100 of $80,000 per each additional 
enlisted recruiter for FY12, the cost breakdown of $80,000 includes the following: 
 Social Security employer contributions 
 Healthcare 
 Training 
 Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) 
 Basic Allowance for Housing 
 Pension 
 Base Pay 
 Special incentives 
The above cost does not include variable costs such as recruiter support costs, 
advertisement, or rating bonuses. 
Using the $80,000 as the cost per recruiter for FY12, yields $8,771 cost per new 
recruit ($80,000/9.12). Another way to look at it is that for all the pay and benefits that an 
enlisted recruiter receives, it is costing the Navy $8,771 per net contract (not including 
advertising or support costs). This is a very basic cost and, according to CNRC, the 
marginal cost of a recruit has not been calculated in the last several years (J. L. Noble, 
personal communication, November 12, 2012). The Army’s cost per net contract using 
the same basic cost is $6,995 per Army recruit, the Marine Corps’ cost per net contract is 
$7,339 per Marine recruit, and the Air Force’s cost per net contract is $3,736 per  
Air Force recruit (JAMRS, 2010). 
The estimated additional cost to send 1,000 new recruiters per year TAD to 
NORU for five-weeks is approximately $0.60M/year. The study suggests that benefits 
could include a reduction to the overall size of the enlisted recruiting force if recruiters 
are able to produce more contracts in a tour. This would be dependent upon the current 
number of recruiters on-board versus the size of the annual goal, due to goal constraining, 
and the increased number of recruit contracts per recruiting tour. Without conducting a 
controlled experiment, trying to predict the increased number of contracts per tour is 
unknown. It could be more from shortening the on-boarding process or less by taking the 
recruiter out of the NRD and sending TAD to NORU for five-weeks. 
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With CNRC data provided from 2007-2011, Figure 7 shows the initial estimates, 
based on potential increased recruiter productivity, during a three-year recruiting tour if 
the annual goal were 34,000. The figure includes the decrease in cost per recruit as the 
total number of contracts obtained over a three-year recruiting tour increases. As the PPR 
increases, fewer resources are needed. 
 
Figure 7. Estimates of Sending a Recruiter TAD to NORU and the Additional 
Productivity Needed to Break Even. 
The estimates were based on the 9.12 average yearly contracts obtained. The cost 
of $80,200 was used, which is the FY12 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(OPNAV) N100 cost of $80,000 used to determine funding requirements plus $600, 
spread out over a three-year recruiting tour, in additional costs for two-way travel. The 
figure provides the estimated break-even point of 0.05 new additional contracts needed 
over a three-year tour to justify sending a recruiter TAD for five weeks to NORU. If the 
number of new contracts over a three-year tour was increased by two, based on an annual 
NRC goal of 34,000, it is estimated, under these conditions, that the size of the recruiter 
force could be reduced by 245 recruiters. This, of course, is based on a cost of $80,200 
per recruiter and without the advertisement, and support costs, it is an estimate. The 
results of this study and analysis were hard to predict without knowing how much more 
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productive a recruiter would be by sending them to NORU after reporting to their NRD 
and what impact a goal constrained environment would have. 
3. Additional Trade-Offs 
 There are additional trade-offs, other than cost, between the current eight-month 
on-boarding process versus the proposed alternative. First, under the alternative  
six-month on-boarding process, the NRD would lose five weeks of possible production 
and time for completion of Advance PQS per new recruiter. By reporting first to the NRD 
for 30 days to complete indoctrination, then sending the new recruiter TAD to NORU for 
the five-week ENRO course, the NRD would lose five weeks total time that is currently 
used for production and completion of Advance PQS. When comparing the time after a 
new recruiter reports to their NRD under the current on-boarding process, the new 
recruiter will have 45 days to complete indoctrination/BRM PQS, then 4.5 months to 
complete Advance PQS requirements (a total of six months). During that time, the 
recruiter is under training but is considered a production recruiter. Under the alternative, 
the recruiter would be pulled away from the NRD to attend NORU training. So it is 
possible that sending the recruiter to NORU after completion of NRD indoctrination 
could be disruptive. The author estimates, however, that the effects would be minimal, 
based on both on-boarding processes being in Phase 1 of the inverted-U curve (the phase 
of lowest productivity) during that time period. The trade-off is to reduce the total  
on-boarding process from eight months to approximately six months and keep the 
recruiters at the NRD in a constant training/production status, or disrupting NRD training 
and production by sending a recruiter to NORU for five-weeks after the recruiter has 
been on-board for 30 days. 
 In addition, based on interviews with enlisted CANREC recruiters, the author 
believes that not everyone should be required to complete the entire five-week ENRO 
course. Over the course of this study, it was noted that several of the same topics were 
taught at NORU and during NRD indoctrination. According to some of the interviewed 
CANREC recruiters, they felt that the NORU course could be shortened by a week, as 
they had just completed their basic PQS requirements, had been exposed to other 
experienced recruiters, and noticed some similarities between indoctrination/BRM PQS 
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and the ENRO course taught at NORU. The ENRO course could then be shortened for 
overlapping areas that are taught and completed during indoctrination. This is a topic 
recommended for further research. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter reviewed the current on-boarding process and analyzed recruiter 
training processes in an effort to improve productivity during the first six months of the 
three-year recruiting tour. By altering when PCS leave is taken and managing recruiter 
force efficiency, the author believes it is possible to decrease the current on-boarding 
process from eight months to six, but how small or large an impact that would have on 
productivity is difficult to predict in a goal-constrained environment without conducting a 
closed experiment. The estimated cost differences between the current and alternative on-
boarding process are anticipated to be minimal, but without knowing the potential loss in 
productivity while the recruiter is TAD for five weeks, it is difficult to provide a true 
cost-benefit-analysis. 
Chapter IV of this study examines the differences in recruiter productivity across 
Navy enlisted ratings to see if Petty Officers in some ratings tend to perform better than 
those in other ratings and if ratings can be used for recruiter selection. 
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IV. DIFFERENCES IN RECRUITER RATING PRODUCTIVITY 
In the simplest of times recruiting is a complex business with the casual 
observer proclaiming that either this factor or another is the “true” driver 
of success when in reality it is a host of factors working together in 
concert. 
—former U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman 
 
The aim of this part of the study is to examine differences in recruiter productivity 
across Navy enlisted active duty ratings to determine whether sailors in some ratings tend 
to perform better than those in other ratings. This second part of the study further refines 
the McCloy et al. (2001) study in an attempt to analyze the variation in recruiter PPR that 
is based on the ASVAB sub-scores for specific ratings. Specifically, the study examines 
the relationship between ASVAB sub-scores and initial recruiter training, the relationship 
between ASVAB sub-scores and PPR for recruiters by rating, and how those results may 
be used to increase the average productivity of the enlisted recruiting force. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the data and provides summary statistics on Navy enlisted 
recruiter productivity across different ratings. For the enlisted rating productivity 
analysis, extracts from two databases were merged. One database provided information 
on the recruiter, while the second provided information on the recruit signed by the 
recruiter. The data files used for this study were obtained from NORU and CNRC. The 
NORU database contained information for 5,518 Navy enlisted recruiters who had 
successfully completed the ENRO course between December 2007 and August 2012. The 
second database used for this study was the Personalized Recruiting for Immediate and 
Delayed Enlistment (PRIDE) database, which contained information for 207,694 recruits 
who enlisted in the Navy between October 2005 and April 2011. The two databases were 
merged together to isolate Navy enlisted active duty recruiters in pay-grades E-5 and E-6 
who were Fleet sailors, had successfully graduated from the ENRO course, and had 
completed at least two years as a production enlisted recruiter. 
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1. Description of the NORU/PRIDE Database 
a. NORU Database 
The NORU recruiter database had information on the recruiter’s class 
number, their full name, the last four digits of their Social Security Number (SSN), their 
rank, their rating, their graduation date, and the name of the NRD they reported to after 
graduating from the course. The database also contained information on how well the 
recruiter performed in each of the four recruiter modules taught during the ENRO course 
curriculum, and whether the enlisted recruiter was a Fleet sailor serving on PCS orders 
under a TEMDUINS status to NORU or was a CANREC who was at NORU serving 
under TAD orders. 
For this study, only those enlisted Navy recruiters serving under PCS 
orders in a TEMDUINS status were analyzed. These were recruiters who came from the 
Fleet and had successfully screened for recruiting duty. CANRECs are Navy Reserve 
enlisted sailors recalled to active duty, generally for two years (but sometimes as long as 
five years, depending on performance), and sent to NORU under TAD orders. The 
CANRECs go through a separate screening board and therefore were dropped from the 
sample. The initial NORU sample of 5,518 recruiters was reduced by 1,240 observations 
because of missing variables or because the recruiter candidate was in a TAD status. 
The NORU database contained 40 different enlisted ratings. “Each rating 
is required to nominate a certain percentage of their rating population for recruiting each 
month” (NPC, 2012, para. 1). Not all ratings are eligible for recruiting duty, so for the 
purpose of this portion of the study, only sailors in those ratings that are eligible for 
recruiting duty were analyzed. 
b. PRIDE Database 
The PRIDE database is used by the Navy to support the enlisted 
accessions process by providing enlisted applicant classification and allocation of training 
resources. The PRIDE database captures enlisted applicant qualifications data and 
determines the ratings and programs for which an enlisted applicant is best qualified. The 
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system matches applicant qualifications to available programs as determined by the needs 
of the Navy and school seat quota availability to provide available options (NRC, 2009). 
The PRIDE recruit database contained information on the sex; race, 
marital status, and AFQT score of recruits who entered the Navy between October 2005 
and April 2011.  PRIDE also included the SSN, and NRD location for the recruiters who 
wrote the enlisted contracts.  That is, each recruit was linked to the recruiter responsible 
for his/her contract. The PRIDE file contained information on AFQT scores for 207,694 
recruits who enlisted between October 2005 and April 2011. The PRIDE database did not 
contain demographics on the recruiters who were responsible for each recruit. The 
sample of recruits from PRIDE was reduced by 82,000 observations because they could 
not be matched to the responsible recruiters contained in the December 2007  
NORU dataset. 
2. Merging the Data 
Preliminary work was performed on the PRIDE and NORU database extracts to 
achieve a single data file that contained information for Navy active duty enlisted 
production recruiters (E-5/E-6) who had completed initial recruiter training at NORU. 
The NORU data file contained information on each recruiter’s grades for each of the four 
training modules, their overall course grade, their rank, their rating, their NRD 
assignment, the date they reported to the NRD, and the total number of contracts written 
for recruiters with at least 18 months of experience. A number of issues arose when 
trying to merge these two databases. 
Prior to merging the data extracts, all those under TAD orders and individuals 
with missing variables were dropped from the NORU database. Furthermore, all 
individuals with a rank and rating ending in C or CS were dropped. These are either 
Chief Petty Officers or Senior Chief Petty Officers who were dropped because they 
usually serve as LCPOs and therefore were nonproduction recruiters. After these 
deletions, the sample contained 3,832 observations. 
The NORU data extracts contained information on the recruiter responsible for 
each recruit including the recruiter’s last, first name, and last four digits of his/her SSN. 
The goal was to merge information from the NORU file with the PRIDE files so that the 
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recruiter’s productivity could be observed over time. The PRIDE data extract contained 
recruiter’s full SSN and NRD, whereas the NORU data set contained only the last four 
digits of the recruiter’s SSN. Using the last four digits of their SSN to merge the files 
resulted in fewer than 30% of all observations matched. Ideally, these two datasets could 
have been merged by a common variable, such as the full SSN. 
To overcome this problem, both data extracts were merged by the last four digits 
of their SSN and by NRD. This resulted in about 60% of all observations being captured 
and yielded a total of 2,157 observations. If the PRIDE data extract included the 
recruiter’s name, more observations could have been merged. All recruiters who spent 
less than 18 months on recruiting duty at the NRD were deleted.  
Those recruiters with less than 18 months of recruiting experience were identified 
based on the date they reported to their NRD and then subtracting the date the PRIDE 
data file ended (April 2011). Because recruiters spend the first six to eight months of their 
recruiting tour in a training capacity with very limited production, the author of this study 
wanted to focus on recruiters who had at least 18 months of recruiting experience in order 
to obtain a more accurate monthly PPR. Furthermore, because the PRIDE data extract 
ended in April 2011, one year of observations from the NORU files were lost. This 
resulted in a total of 1,012 observations being captured for the study. 
In addition, 24 recruiters who were in the pay grade of E-6 and had completed a 
three-year recruiting tour were dropped because their PPR was below 0.30. This was 
based on the assumption that these recruiters were promoted to LPO, which is a normal 
path for a high-achieving production recruiter. This decision was confirmed from the 
interviews conducted and resulted in a final analysis sample of 987 observations used for 
this study. 
3. Summary Statistics 
The sample of 987 recruiter observations contained the following variables: 
Module 1 average score, Module 2 average score, Module 3 average score, Module 4 
average score, the overall ENRO average score, the average PPR, and the minimum 
ASVAB sub-score necessary to qualify for a given rating. The minimum ASVAB  
sub-score was chosen as a proxy for ability because the data files used for this study did 
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not contain the recruiters’ actual ASVAB scores. This is explained further in the next 
section. Table 4 provides descriptive statics for these variables. 






Module 1 987  92.23  5.28 
Module 2 987  89.76  5.05 
Module 3 987  87.94  5.15 
Module 4 987  90.33  4.97 
ENRO Composite 987  90.07  3.73 
PPR 987  1.21  0.45 
ASVAB Sub-Score 987  183.47  40.13 
 
The low variance found in the ENRO course grades, along with the course 
module average were similar to the results found in the McCloy et al. (2001) study based 
on their sample of 1,055 recruiter observations. The low variation can be attributed to the 
80% minimum score needed to pass the course and the data set not including 
observations for those recruiters who failed the course. For comparison purposes, Table 5 
provides the ENRO course grades from the McCloy et al. (2001) study. 






Module 2 1,055  90.60  6.10 
Module 3 1,055  90.70  6.30 
Module 4 1,055  87.70  5.70 
ENRO Composite 1,055  89.70  4.80 
 
The PPR average of 1.21 in the sample used in this study can be compared to the 
CNRC average PPR of 0.86 from the same time period. The difference in PPR could be 
the result of this study dropping recruiters who were in pay grades E-7/E-8 and whose 
PPR was below 0.30. The interviews indicated that E-7/E-8 recruiters who were in a 
production status for less than six months during a three-year tour generally went on to 
become LCPOs in a nonproduction status. The higher PPR in this data set may also be 
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attributable to the 24 recruiters in pay grade E-6 who were dropped because their PPR 
was below 0.30, even though they had completed a three-year tour. It is assumed that 
after 12-18 months they were promoted to an LPO position at a recruiting station. The 
ASVAB sub-score was included to serve as a proxy for cognitive ability and will be 
discussed in Section B. Table 6 shows that 68% of all recruiters were in pay grade E-5. 
Table 6. Recruiter Demographics by Pay Grade. 
Characteristic N Percent 
E-5 676 0.68 
E-6 311 0.32 
 
Table 7 shows the distribution of recruiters by rating. Not all ratings are used in 
this study; only those whose communities which designate a certain percentage each 
month for recruiting duty were used. 
Table 7. Distribution of Recruiters by Rating 
Characteristic N          Percent                Characteristic       N Percent 
ABE 9                 0.01                 ET                          28 0.03 
ABF 16               0.02                 FC                          44 0.05 
ABH 16               0.02                 GM                        23 0.02 
AD 31               0.03                 GSE                       9 0.01 
AE 35               0.04                 GSM                      30 0.03 
AM 48               0.05                 HT                         18 0.02 
AME 18               0.02                 IC                           8 0.01 
AO 32               0.03                 MA                        17 0.02 
AT 28               0.03                 MM                       116 0.12 
AW 11               0.01                 OS                          52 0.05 
BM 82               0.08                 PR                          4 0.005 
BU 10               0.01                 PS                          5 0.005 
CE 6               0.005                 QM                        26 0.03 
CM 12               0.01                 SH                         11 0.01 
CS 23               0.02                 SK                         26 0.03 
CT 39               0.04                 STG                       27 0.03 




36               0.04                 SW                         6 
22               0.02                 UT                          8 






B. USE OF THE NORU/PRIDE DATABASE TO ANALYZE THE VARIOUS 
NAVY ENLISTED RATINGS 
As stated in the Introduction, one of the goals of this study is to analyze the PPR 
and initial recruiter training test scores for Navy E-5 and E-6 ratings serving on active 
duty and serving in a rating that designates a percentage of their rating population for 
recruiting duty. Several studies have focused on the effect of cognitive ability on sales 
performance, but little research has been done on comparing the rating’s minimum test 
score requirement to the recruiters’ average production. 
 This section examines the differences in recruiter productivity across Navy 
enlisted ratings in an effort to determine if petty officers (E-5/E-6) in ratings that require 
higher cognitive skills, on average, perform better than those in ratings with lower 
cognitive skills. The goal is to determine how those results may be used to increase the 
average productivity of the enlisted recruiting force by increasing or decreasing the 
percentages of enlisted sailors nominated for recruiting duty from the eligible rating 
communities. 
1. Criteria 
Before running any analysis, two variables of primary interest—recruiter PPR and 
recruiter ASVAB sub-scores—presented several problems that had to be resolved: 
 The total number of recruiter contracts in the PRIDE sample was provided. As 
previously mentioned, individuals in pay grade E-8 with low PPRs were 
dropped because they were in a nonproduction status. Several E-6 sailors with 
PPRs below 0.30 also were dropped due to the assumption that they were 
promoted to LPO. 
 The average PPR per recruiter had to be calculated manually, based on the 
total number of contracts written divided by the total number of months the 
recruiter was on-production. This was computed for every recruiter in the 
sample who had served at least 18 months as a production recruiter. 
 The ASVAB sub-score had to be calculated for every rating in the sample. 
The minimum ASVAB sub-score needed to qualify for a rating was calculated 
only for those ratings that are required to designate a percentage of the rating 
population for recruiting duty. The minimum qualifying ASVAB score was 
used as a proxy variable for cognitive ability. 
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The ASVAB is broken down into nine sections in the following order: General 
Science (GS), Arithmetic Reasoning (AR), Word Knowledge (WK), Paragraph 
Comprehension (PC), Mathematics Knowledge (MK), Electronics Information (EI), Auto 
Shop (AS), Mechanical Comprehension (MC), and Assembling Objects (AO). The 
Verbal (VE) is not a separate section of the ASVAB, but is the raw WK + PC score. 
Specific Navy enlisted jobs (ratings) require minimal composite scores derived from the 
selected sub-tests of the ASVAB. For example, the minimum line score requirement to 
qualify to become an Aviation Boatswain’s Mate-Equipment (ABE), Aviation 
Boatswain’s Mate-Fuels (ABF), or Aviation Boatswain’s Mate – Handling (ABH), is  
VE + AR + MK + AS = 184. 
Not every rating uses the same sub-tests of the ASVAB to determine the 
minimum line score requirement. For example, some ratings require a heavy emphasis on 
math or science skills, and some ratings require more emphasis on mechanical skills, 
while other ratings require minimal verbal skills. 
The potential for bias was addressed by using COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 
1130.8J-Volume IV (2011) to review all 40 ratings’ line score requirements and 
minimum scores. It was found that most ratings offered two composite score 
requirements. For example, Aviation Support (AS) is determined by 
VE+AR+MK+AS=210 or VE+AR+MK+MC=210. In those cases, the required  
sub-scores that were the same were used to assign their overall composite score. This 
approach worked for most of the ratings, in an effort to have a standardized system of 
conversion. 
There were fewer than 10 ratings that did not use the same composite scores as 
other ratings. These ratings did not require the math or technical skills and were placed in 
nontechnical “groups.” Table 8 shows the minimum rating ASVAB sub-score 
requirements needed to qualify for each rating. Appendix D contains the ASVAB test 





Table 8. ASVAB Sub-Score Requirements. 
Min. ASVAB Sub-Score Sub-Tests Navy Enlisted Rating 
88 VE+AR CS 
95 VE+AR SH 
96 VE+AR QM 
98 VE+AR+MK+AS MA 
102 VE+AR SK 
105 VE+MK PS, YN 
109 VE+AR CTR 
145 AR+MC+AS BU, EO, SW 
157 VE+MK+CS OS 
162 VE+MK+GS CTI, CTT 
175 VE+AR+MK+AS BM 
184 VE+AR+MK+AS ABE, ABF, ABH 
185 VE+AR+MK+AS AO, PR 
200 VE+AR+MK+AS GSM, MM 
201 AR+MK+EI+GS CE, UT 
205 VE+AR+MK+AS DC, EN, HT 
210 VE+AR+MK+MC AD, AM, AW, EM, GSE 
213 AR+MK+EI+GS IC 
222 VE+AR+MK+MC AE, AT 
223 AR+MK+EI+GS CTM, ET, FC, STG 
2. Procedure 
To analyze the relationships between ASVAB sub-score and ENRO course grade 
the author created five groups, based on the rating’s minimum required ASVAB test 
score, with an equal or similar number of observations to ensure a large enough sample 
size to ensure equal sampling distribution of their means. This was necessary due to some 
ratings having as few as four observations, with other ratings having as many as 116 
observations. The larger the size of each sample, the smaller the standard deviation of the 
sampling distribution of means. The author wanted a realistic picture of the relationship 
between the minimum ASVAB sub-scores needed for nontechnical and technical ratings 
and their overall performance at ENRO. The same procedure was used to analyze the 
relationship between minimum ASVAB sub-scores required and PPR. 
Five rating groups were created to compare the mean ENRO score in each group 
against the total sample mean’s ENRO scores and to also compare the groups’ mean PPR 
against the total sample mean PPR. The five rating groups were: 
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 GROUP I – ratings that do not require a great deal of math skills, or technical 
ability based on ASVAB requirements. These ratings primarily consist of 
customer service-type ratings. 
 Minimum ASVAB sub-score: 88-157 (BU, CS, CTR, EO, MA, OS, PS, QM, 
SH, SK, YN). N=218. 
 GROUP II – ratings that require some proficiency in math, and/or technical 
ability in working with aircraft or machinery. 
 Minimum ASVAB sub-score: 162-185 (CM, CTI, BM, ABE, ABF, AO, PR). 
N=188 
 GROUP III – ratings that require technical knowledge of machinery and 
complex machine parts. 
 Minimum ASVAB sub-score: 200-205 (GSM, MM, EN, UT, DC, GM, HT). 
N=243 
 GROUP IV – ratings that require electrical knowledge and/or skills needed 
working with jet engine aircraft. 
 Minimum ASVAB sub-score: 210-213 (AD, AM, AME, AW, EM, IC). 
N=161. 
 GROUP V – ratings that require the most technical ability in working with 
electrical systems, aircraft, and complex weapons systems. 
 Minimum ASVAB sub-score: 222-235 (AE, AT, CTM, ET, FC, STG, STS). 
N=176. 
C. RESULTS 
Before analyzing the results, descriptive statics were computed from each group 
to examine the distributions and identify any violations of normalcy assumptions. These 
descriptive statics differ from those presented in Tables 4 through 8 because those tables 
included the descriptive statistics for the recruiter variables. 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 9 and 10 present descriptive statistics for the complete data set and show 
that, on average, the ENRO test scores were around 90% and the average PPR was 
around 1.21 contracts.  
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 9, assuming that the data came from a 
normal distribution with unknown mean and standard deviation, the 95% confidence 
intervals for the ENRO average grade is 89.835 and 90.305. 
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Table 9. ENRO Average Grade (2007-2011). 
ENRO Average Grade (2007-2011) 
Mean 90.07 
Standard Error 0.12 
Standard Deviation 3.73 






Confidence Intervals (95%) 89.835/90.305 
Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 10, assuming that the data came from a 
normal distribution with unknown mean and standard deviation, the 95% confidence 
intervals for PPR is 1.182 and 1.238. 
  
 50 
Table 10. Recruiter PPR Average (2007-2011). 
PPR (Three-Year Average) 
Mean 1.21 
Standard Error 0.01 
Standard Deviation 0.45 






Confidence Intervals (95%) 1.182/1.238 
\ 
Table 11 shows the ENRO course average grade for each of the five rating 
groups. Group I is comprised of ratings that require few technical skills or cognitive 
ability based on their minimum required ASVAB scores. It was interesting to find that, 
on average, the mean ENRO grades were similar for Groups I through III. Group V had 
the highest overall mean score of 92%, which was 2% above the sample population. 
Group V consisted of ratings that required the highest cognitive ability. 




Mean SE SD SV Skewness Range Min. Max. Count C.I. (95%) 
I 89.65 0.23 3.43 11.80 0.11 18.50 81.25 99.75 218 89.192/90.108 
II 89.1 0.27 3.68 13.57 0.25 16.00 81.75 97.75 188 88.570/89.630 
III 89.58 0.26 3.99 15.96 –0.17 18.50 80.50 99.00 243 89.075/90.085 
IV 90.36 0.29 3.71 13.79 –0.21 14.75 82.50 97.25 161 89.782/90.938 
V 91.99 0.23 2.99 8.99 –0.39 17.00 82.00 99.00 176 91.544/92.436 
 
A Two-Sample T-test (assuming unequal variances) was used to check if the mean 
ENRO course grades were statistically different among all five groups, as the author of this 
study wanted to know if the mean ENRO course average for a particular group was equal to 
the mean ENRO course average of another group. The results of comparing mean ENRO 
grades between Groups I and II are shown in Table 12. The mean was not statistically 
different as the t-stat was found to be less than the t-critical (1.56<1.97), as shown in Table 
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12. In other words, the author failed to reject that the mean Group I ENRO average was equal 
to the mean Group II ENRO average with 95% confidence. 






Mean 89.66 89.10 
Variance 11.80 13.57 
Observations 218 188 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 386 
 t Stat 1.56 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.06 
 t Critical one-tail 1.65 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.12 
 t Critical two-tail 1.97   
 
The results of comparing mean ENRO grades between Groups I and III are shown 
in Tables 13. The means were not statistically different as the t-stat was found to be less 
than the t-critical (0.23<1.97), as shown in Tables 13. The author failed to reject that the 
mean Group I ENRO average was equal to the mean Group III ENRO average with  
95% confidence. 






Mean 89.66 89.58 
Variance 11.80 15.96 
Observations 218 243 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 458 
 t Stat 0.23 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.41 
 t Critical one-tail 1.65 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.82 
 t Critical two-tail 1.97   
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The results of comparing mean ENRO grades between III and V are shown in 
Tables 14. The means were not statistically different as the t-stat was found to be less 
than the t-critical (-7.04<1.97), as shown in Table 14. The author failed to reject that the 
mean Group III ENRO average was equal to the mean Group V ENRO average with  
95% confidence. 
The mean average of Group V was approximately 2% higher than the mean 
average of Groups I-IV and the variance was lower. Enlisted recruiters in Group V are 
considered the most technically skilled ratings in the Navy. The minimum ASVAB sub-
score requires proficiency in math, electronics, and science, so it was not surprising to see 
the higher mean score. 






Mean 89.58 91.99 
Variance 15.96 8.99 
Observations 243 176 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 416 
 t Stat -7.04 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00 
 t Critical one-tail 1.65 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00 
 t Critical two-tail 1.97  
 
The author of this study chose not to compute individual t-stats for all 20 possible 
ENRO Course Grade pairwise combinations. Therefore, the author chose to estimate an 
OLS regression to examine all rating group differences for the 20 possible pairwise 
combinations. The dependent variable used was ENRO Course Grade. The author created 
dummy independent variables for all ratings in Groups I though V, based on the ratings 
minimum ASVAB sub-score. Table 15 shows the relationship between ASVAB sub-
scores and training grades using OLS regression. From Table 15, the data shows that, on 
average, recruiter ENRO grades are 0.69 points higher for Group IV than for Group I. 
The estimated coefficient of Group IV was found to be statistically significant. The data 
also shows that, on average, recruiter ENRO course grades are 2.31 points higher for 
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ratings in Group V than in Group I. The estimated coefficient of Group V was found to 
be statistically significant. The hypothesis of higher cognitive ability leading to higher 
ENRO course grades further validated previous research. The R
2
 was 0.08, which means 
ASVAB sub-scores explained 8% of the variation in recruiter grades. This is lower than 
the R
2
 of 0.22 in the McCloy et al. (2001) study. The difference may be due to the use of 
proxies for cognitive ability here, rather than the recruiter’s actual ASVAB scores. 
Table 15. Regression of ENRO Grade on ASVAB Minimum Score. 
Variables Coefficients Standard Error 
Constant 89.67 0.24 
Group II –0.59 0.36 
Group III –0.09 0.34 
Group IV 0.69* 0.37 
Group V 2.31*** 0.36 
***p<0.01, *p<0.1   
 
Table 16 shows the PPR average for recruiters in each of the five rating groups. 
Group I is again comprised of ratings that require few technical skills (or cognitive 
ability) based on their rating minimum ASVAB scores. Groups IV and V are comprised 
of ratings that require high cognitive ability. On average, the mean PPR between  
Groups I, II, IV, and V were similar. Group III, which is comprised of primarily 
construction or general mechanical ratings, on average, had a mean PPR of 1.16, which is 
about 4% below the sample mean and 6% below Groups II and IV. 
Table 16. PPR Average by Rating Group. 
PPR AVERAGE 
Group Mean SE SD SV Skewness Range Min. Max. Count C.I. (95%) 
I 1.22 0.03 0.45 0.20 0.36 2.05 0.34 2.39 218 1.160/1.280 
II 1.23 0.03 0.46 0.21 0.50 2.49 0.35 2.84 188 1.165/1.295 
III 1.16 0.03 0.46 0.21 0.42 2.16 0.30 2.46 243 1.103/1.217 
IV 1.23 0.03 0.43 0.18 0.47 2.26 0.33 2.59 161 1.164/1.296 
V 1.22 0.03 0.45 0.20 0.68 2.30 0.42 2.72 176 1.154/1.286 
A Two-Sample T-test assuming unequal variances was used to check if the means 
were statistically different between all five rating groups. The results between Groups III 
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and V are shown in Table 17. The means were not statistically different as the t-stat was 
found to be less than the t-critical two-tail (–1.515<1.966). 
Table 17. PPR Two-sample T-test for Unequal Variances. 
 
Group III PPR 
Avg. 
Group V PPR 
Avg. 
Mean 1.16 1.22 
Variance 0.21 0.20 
Observations 243 176 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 382 
 t Stat –1.52 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.07 
 t Critical one-tail 1.65 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.13 
 t Critical two-tail 1.97  
The author of this study chose not to compute individual t-stats for all 20 possible 
PPR pairwise combinations. Therefore, the author chose to estimate an OLS regression to 
examine all rating group differences for the 20 possible pairwise combinations. The 
dependent variable used was recruiter PPR and the independent variables used were 
Group I ASVAB minimum score, Group II ASVAB minimum score, Group III ASVAB 
minimum score, and Group IV ASVAB minimum score. The author chose to use Group 
V as the reference group based on the assumption from the interviews conducted, that 
cognitive skills didn’t translate into higher recruiter production. Table 18 shows the 
relationship between ASVAB sub-scores by rating and recruiter PPR using OLS 
regression. From Table 18, the data shows that, on average, recruiter PPR was higher by 
0.08 contracts for ratings in Group I versus Group V and the estimated coefficient was 
found to be statistically significant. The estimated coefficients from Groups II through IV 
were not statistically different from Group V. The hypothesis of higher cognitive ability 
leading to higher PPR was not the case in this study. The R
2
 was 0.02, which means 
ASVAB Sub Scores explained 2% of the variation in recruiter PPR. This is slightly 
higher than the R
2
 of 0.013 in the McCloy et al. (2001) study. The difference may be due 
to the use of proxies for cognitive ability here, rather than the recruiter’s actual  
ASVAB scores. 
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Table 18. Regression of PPR on ASVAB Minimum Score. 
Variables Coefficients Standard Error 
Constant 1.18 0.03 
Group I 0.08* 0.05 
Group II 0.05 0.04 
Group III 0.02 0.04 
Group IV 0.06 0.05 
*p<0.1   
2. Trade-Offs 
During the course of gathering data and interviewing individuals for this study, 
the general hypothesis was that recruiters who had higher cognitive ability would not 
only perform better at NORU, but would have higher productivity. According to the 
interviews, some LPOs and LCPOs, based on their years of recruiting experience, 
thought that ratings in a customer service-type of capacity had higher productivity. When 
asked why, the reasons varied from working well with others to being able to work 
independently. Other interviewees, based on their experience, concluded that engineering 
type of ratings had higher productivity based on the Navy ship culture of working long 
hours and having a “can’t fail” type of mindset. The data, however, indicates that ratings 
that required higher cognitive ability, on average, did not necessarily perform any better 
than other ratings requiring less cognitive ability. 
In the McCloy et al. (2001) study, the authors concluded that ASVAB test scores 
only predicted 1.3% of the variation in recruiter productivity and 22% of the variance in 
the enlisted recruiters’ overall performance in their initial training school (ENRO). 
Furthermore, McCloy et al. (2001) concluded that NORU grades “added virtually no 
information to the prediction of recruiter quantity of production” p. ii. This study and the 
McCloy et al. (2001) study did support the relationship between high-ability ratings and 
their performance at NORU, but found very little relationship between high-ability 
ratings and their production as a recruiter. 
Based on the findings of this study and others, there are trade-offs involved in the 
composition of the enlisted recruiter force. For example, during periods of growth, when 
the size of the recruiter force is expanding, it would be more cost effective for the Navy 
to increase the percentage of recruiters that are in rating Groups I and II based on the 
 56 
average annual salary the Navy has to pay for that resource. Sailors in rating Groups I 
and II are less costly because they seldom receive a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). 
Every year the Navy modifies and designates who qualifies for an SRB. These are 
men and women who have completed a four-year tour of duty and are in ratings that 
require greater technical skills and take longer to train. In years when the Navy has a 
shortage of these critical skills, sailors who have completed a tour of duty are generally 
offered an SRB to reenlist in the Navy. Some of the bonuses that are paid require those 
sailors to stay in a job that utilizes those critical skills. Other bonuses are paid to specific 
type of ratings that allow the sailor to pursue orders to a job that is not related to their 
critical skills. Generally, unless there is a critical shortage of nontechnical type of ratings, 
these sailors are not offered an SRB. It would be more cost effective to increase the size 
of the recruiter force with individuals that have, on average, the same level of recruiter 
productivity as those ratings that are offered SRBs. 
Furthermore, expanding the size of the recruiter force with sailors who are not in 
critical shortage skills, allows the Navy to distribute sailors with high-demand skills in 
areas that are needed most, which is generally at sea. In periods of contraction, the Navy 
would be better off reducing the percentages of those high skill-rating populations that 
are assigned to recruiting duty. Doing so, would allow the Navy to allocate those 
resources and skills where they are needed most. 
Figure 8 displays the individual rating productivity for several ratings whose 
sample size was greater than 30. Because of the number of dropped observations during 
the data merging process, there were several rating samples with observations that ranged 
from as few as four to as many as 116. Only those ratings with sample populations 
greater than 30 are shown. 
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Figure 8. Monthly PPR for Several Ratings. 
According to Figure 8, Aviation Machinist Mates (AD), Aviation Structural 
Mechanic (AM), Culinary Specialists (CS), and Fire Controlman (FC) had the highest 
average monthly PPR. Yeoman (YN), Machinist Mate (MM), and Electricians Mate 
(EM) had the lowest average monthly PPR. It would be possible for CNRC to increase 
recruiter productivity by employing more of the FCs, ADs, and AMs, while reducing the 
percentage of YNs and MMs, as every rating community is required each month to 
nominate a certain percentage of their rating population for recruiting duty. However, if 
some of those ratings qualify for a SRB, would the higher PPR offset the cost of paying 
the SRB? Listed below is the definition of the SRB and how it is used by the Navy. 
The intent of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is to incentivize Sailors 
with critical skills and experience to stay Navy. SRB rewards Sailors who attain 
special training in skills most needed in the fleet, and helps meet critical skill 
reenlistment benchmarks and enhance Navy’s ability to size, shape and stabilize 
manning. Award levels are strategically adjusted as reenlistment requirements for 



















Avg. PPR by Rating
  Sample Avg. PPR 
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In answering the previous question “if some of those ratings qualify for the SRB, 
would the higher PPR offset the cost of paying the SRB,” the following is a comparison 
between a recruiter whose rating requires proficient technical ability (Group V) and a 
recruiter in a rating that is nontechnical (Group I). 
 If NRC were to hire a FC who earned an SRB of $60,000 for a four-year 
reenlistment and was allowed to be detailed to recruiting command for three years, the 
total cost would be $300,000, based on the OPNAV N100 enlisted cost of $80,000 per 
year to fund an enlisted billet plus the SRB amount of $60,000. The FC has a monthly 
PPR of 1.32, or 15.84 contracts per year. The annual cost for the FC recruiter is $100,000 
per year for three years while assigned to recruiting duty. The cost per recruit is $6,313 
for employing the FC recruiter with an SRB and the total number of contracts obtained 
over a three-year period would equal 47.52. 
Using the same analogy, if NRC were to hire a YN who typically does not qualify 
for an SRB for three years as an enlisted recruiter, the total cost would be $240,000, or 
$80,000 per year. The YN has a monthly PPR of 1.13 or 13.56 contracts per year. The 
cost per recruit for the YN is $5,899. The total number of contracts written for the YN 
over a three-year period would equal 40.68. Even though the Navy might get greater 
production from the FC, it will cost $414 more per recruit using an FC rather than a YN. 
The Navy would be better off with the YN. The other ramification of employing 
recruiters who have critical skills sets is the additional opportunity cost to the Navy of not 
having that rating in their critical billets. 
In addition, the Navy might be better off with more E-5 production recruiters and 
fewer E-6 production recruiters. The trade-off would be having lower cost individuals in 
recruiting, but at the expense of losing experienced leadership needed to fill LPO 
positions who gain experience as production recruiters. Furthermore, sailors must spend 
some time on shore duty, often in billets unrelated to their primary specialty. 
Table 19 shows the relationship between pay grade and recruiter PPR using OLS 
regression. The R
2
 was 0.02, which means pay grade differences explained 2% of the 
variation in recruiter PPR. Table 19 shows that, on average, E-5 recruiters (who started 
and completed a three-year tour as an E-5) have a higher PPR than E-6 recruiters. 
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What is not known and was not captured in the PRIDE data, are those recruiters 
who begin their recruiting tour in pay grade E-5 and then during the course of their 36-
month recruiting tour are promoted to pay grade E-6. Based on the interviews conducted, 
sailors can be meritoriously advanced from E-5 to E-6 (usually two or three per NRD), or 
advanced by normal time-in-grade promotions. Those promoted to E-6, may be called to 
serve as an LPO depending on the needs of the NRD and the number of CRF recruiters 
available in pay-grade E-6. Therefore, the effects may be overstated as some of the E-5 
recruiters may have been promoted to E-6. 
The estimated coefficient in Table 19 was found to be statistically significant at 
the 1%-level and is 10% below the mean sample population PPR of 1.21. If the Navy 
were to identify the annual average openings for LPO positions and restricted those to  
E-6 pay grades, it could allow the Navy to select and keep the highest performing 
production recruiters. One recommendation would be to restrict production recruiters to 
the E-4/E-5 pay grades and keep enough E-6 recruiters to fill the LPO positions. The 
descriptive statistics for both E-5 and E-6 recruiters are listed in Table 20. 
Table 19. Regression of PPR on Pay Grade. 
Variables Coefficients Standard Error 
Constant 1.25 0.02 
E-6 –0.13*** 0.03 
***p<0.01   
Based on the Confidence Intervals of in Table 20, assuming that the data came 
from a normal distribution with unknown mean and standard deviation, the 95% 




Table 20. E-5 and E-6 Descriptive Results. 
 
E-5 Avg. PPR E-6 Avg. PPR 
Mean 1.25 1.12 
Standard Error 0.02 0.02 
Standard Deviation 0.46 0.42 
Sample Variance 0.21 0.18 
Skewness 0.47 0.51 
Range 2.51 2.12 
Minimum 0.33 0.30 
Maximum 2.84 2.42 
Count 676 310 
Confidence Intervals (95%) 1.221/1.279 1.071/1.169 
3. Conclusions 
The Navy has adopted an RAB to screen potential recruiters. Because recruiters 
serve as ambassadors of the Navy to the communities in which they serve and provide the 
critical manpower supply needed for sustained operations, it is important for the Navy to 
make good decisions about which recruiters will be cost effective. 
The results of this study suggest that ratings that require higher cognitive ability, 
on average, slightly outperformed ratings with lower cognitive ability during initial 
recruiter training. The data suggests the effects, on average, were 3% higher for some 
ratings that required higher ASVAB sub-scores with respect to their ENRO course grades 
while assigned to NORU. The results are statistically significant, but had  
marginal effects. 
Furthermore, there was a slight difference in recruiter productivity between some 
ratings that required higher cognitive ability and some ratings with lower cognitive 
ability. The results of this study do suggest differences in productivity among all the 
various ratings. The links between aptitude, personality, behavior, and sales and 
recruiting performance were identified in Borman et al. (1979); Penny et al. (2007); and 
Bearden et al. (2000). Penney et al. (2007) found the highest correlations were between 
selling skills and production (0.61), human relations skills and production (0.33), and 
organizing skills and production (0.23). Further research is recommended to fully 
quantify the cost of a rating screening process and understanding the differences in 
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cognitive ability, the different cultures of each rating, and their correlation to recruiting 
performance. 
Chapter V of this study provides a summary of the study, conclusions, 
recommendations, and areas for further study. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In a budget-constrained environment, efficient management of the Navy’s enlisted 
recruiter force has become increasingly important. Developing new strategies would 
allow the Navy to more readily adjust to changing market conditions in an effort to 
improve individual recruiter productivity. This study has extended prior research on 
enlisted Navy recruiter productivity by examining the initial assignment and training 
process for enlisted recruiters, known as the “on-boarding” process. This study examined 
how that on-boarding process might be shortened to allow more time to be devoted to  
on-production recruiting during a recruiter’s tour of duty. Furthermore, this study 
examined the differences in recruiter productivity across Navy enlisted ratings to see if 
petty officers in some ratings performed better than those in other ratings. 
A. SUMMARY 
The average eight months of time spent training a fully qualified enlisted 
recruiter—from the time they report to their initial recruiter training to the time they pass 
their advance qualification boards—is significant. During the first four to six months, the 
average recruiter workload is primarily limited to working with applicants whose “kits” 
(necessary paperwork required for enlistment) were started by other, more experienced 
recruiters. Considering that six to eight months of a three-year tour is spent training and 
that, on average, the final six months are often spent turning over to his or her relief and 
getting prepared for their next set of orders, the average window for maximum 
productivity during a recruiting tour is only two years. This study evaluated how the  
on-boarding process might be shortened by altering when a recruiter first reports to initial 
training. The analysis determined that it is possible to increase individual productivity 
during the on-boarding period with minimal to no increase in cost to the Navy. However, 
this would be dependent on the current number of recruiters on-board and the size of the 
annual goal, due to goal constraints, and the change in the total number of contracts per 
recruiting tour. 
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The second part of the study examined differences in recruiter productivity across 
Navy enlisted active duty ratings to see whether sailors in some ratings performed better 
than those in other ratings. This study analyzed the variation in recruiter PPR that is 
based on the minimum required ASVAB sub-scores for specific ratings. Specifically, this 
study examined the relationship between minimum ASVAB sub-scores and initial 
recruiter training success, and the relationship between minimum ASVAB sub-scores and 
PPR for recruiters by rating, and how those results may be used to increase the average 
productivity of the enlisted recruiting force. The goal of the analysis was to determine if 
it is possible to increase the average productivity of the enlisted recruiting force. 
The results of the second part of this study suggested that ratings that required 
higher cognitive ability, on average, slightly outperformed ratings with lower cognitive 
ability during initial recruiter training. The data suggested that the effects, on average, 
were 3% higher for some of the ratings that required higher minimum ASVAB  
sub- scores with respect to their ENRO training course grades at NORU. The results were 
statistically significant, but the size of the effects was relatively small. 
Furthermore, the second part of this study found that there were slight differences 
in recruiter productivity between some ratings that required higher cognitive ability and 
some ratings with lower cognitive ability. The results of this part suggested differences in 
productivity among all the various ratings, as well as significant productivity differences 
between recruiters in pay-grades E-5 and E-6. 
Further research is recommended for this part of the study to fully quantify the 
cost of a rating screening process and understanding the differences in cognitive ability, 
the different cultures of each rating, and their correlation to recruiting performance. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To achieve efficient management of the Navy’s enlisted recruiter force, NRC 
should thoroughly analyze the efficiency of the current on-boarding process, as well as 
the varying productivity levels among recruiters from different rating communities. An 
understanding of the current eight-month on-boarding process and the limitations it has 
potentially placed on recruiter productivity is critical to extending the “high-productivity 
phase” during an enlisted recruiter’s tour of duty. Furthermore, an understanding of the 
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differences in recruiter productivity among the different enlisted ratings could allow the 
Navy to efficiently manage the enlisted recruiter force during periods of growth and 
retraction. The following recommendations, generated from the findings of this study, 
could help to support the efficient management of the Navy’s enlisted recruiter force by 
increasing recruiter productivity. 
1. Altering the On-Boarding Process 
Would it be cost-effective for NRC to change the on-boarding process to reduce 
the length from eight months to six? 
a. Conclusion 
By altering when PCS leave is taken and managing recruiter force 
efficiency, the author believes it is possible to decrease the current on-boarding process 
from eight months to six. However, it is difficult to accurately predict the impact of this 
change in the process on recruiter productivity due to the goal-constrained environment. 
The estimated cost differences between the current and alternative on-boarding process 
are anticipated to be small, but without knowing the potential loss in productivity while 
the recruiter is TAD for five weeks, it is difficult to provide a true cost-benefit analysis. 
The estimated additional cost to send 1,000 new recruiters per year TAD 
to NORU for five weeks is approximately $600,000/year. The study suggests that 
benefits could include a reduction in the overall size of the enlisted recruiting force if 
recruiters are able to produce more contracts during their recruiting tour. This would be 
dependent on the current number of recruiters on-board versus the size of the annual goal 
and the increased number of recruit contracts achieved per recruiting tour. Without 
conducting a controlled experiment, trying to predict the increased number of contracts 
per tour is unknown due to variables that are constantly changing, such as individual 
PPR, the size of the enlisted recruiting force, and yearly adjustments made to the overall 
recruiting goal. Enlisted recruiting contracts could increase due to the shortening of the 
on-boarding or decrease by taking the recruiter out of the NRD and sending him/her TAD 
to NORU for five weeks out of a 36-month recruiting tour. 
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b. Recommendation 
CNRC should conduct a controlled, randomized experiment to determine 
the feasibility of implementing the six-month alternative on-boarding process on a 
permanent basis. The proposed design of the randomized experiment would include a 
treatment group consisting of 600 newly screened enlisted Fleet sailors in pay grade E-5 
who are serving on active duty. NPC detailers would continue reserving ENRO school 
seat assignment. The treatment group would receive PCS orders directly to their NRD 
and would complete their PCS move prior to reporting to the District. While at their 
NRD, the treatment group would complete NRD indoctrination/BRM PQS over the next 
30 days. After successful completion of BRM PQS, the new recruiter in the treatment 
group would report to NORU under TAD orders by their report to date. After completion 
of the ENRO training course, recruiters in the treatment group would draw SDAP of 
$450 per month and report back to their NRD to begin Advance PQS. The treatment 
recruiter would have four months to complete Advance PQS upon returning to  
their NRD. 
The control group would consist of all recruiters who were not in the 
treatment group under the current eight-month on-boarding process. The average annual 
output of students who attend ENRO is approximately 1,200. The recommended length 
of study for the controlled, randomized experiment would be three years, which is the 
average tour length of an enlisted production recruiter, with intermittent results after 
every year. 
The total estimated cost to send 600 recruiters who are in the treatment 
group TAD to NORU for five-weeks is $4.86 million and would require reallocation of 
funds from NPC to NRC. This cost is based on the average per diem, lodging, and travel 
cost of $7,500 per recruiter plus the estimated $600 cost difference for two-way travel 
versus one-way travel. 
At the end of every year, intermittent results could be conducted by 
comparing the average PPR of recruiters in the experimental group to that of recruiters in 
the control group. At the end of the experiment, surveys with LPOs could also be 
conducted to determine the reduction of skill decay, time differences to complete 
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Advance PQS, and if the recruiters in the treatment group were better prepared to meet 
the challenges of recruiting. A two-sample t-test for equal, but unknown, variance could 
be used to determine the statistical significance of differences in PPR. 
2. Difference in Productivity across Enlisted Ratings 
Do certain enlisted ratings, based on the required ASVAB scores, have a higher 
PPR than other enlisted ratings and what are the implications for getting more or fewer 
recruiters from certain ratings? 
a. Conclusion 
The Navy has adopted an RAB to screen potential recruiters. Because 
recruiters serve as ambassadors of the Navy to the communities in which they serve and 
provide the critical manpower supply needed for sustained operations, it is important for 
the Navy to make good decisions about which recruiters will be cost effective. 
The results of this study suggest that ratings that require higher cognitive 
ability, on average, slightly outperformed ratings with lower cognitive ability during 
initial recruiter training at NORU. The data suggests that course grades at NORU, on 
average, were 3% higher for some ratings that required higher minimum ASVAB  
sub-scores. The results are statistically significant, but the effects were small. 
In addition, the results of this study suggest that E-5 recruiters have higher 
PPRs than E-6 recruiters, which suggests the Navy might consider a policy of shifting 
toward more E-5 recruiters and fewer E-6 recruiters. The benefit to the Navy would be 
the lower cost of the E-5 recruiters; however, the cost would be the loss of experienced 
leadership needed to fill LPO positions. If the Navy were to identify the annual average 
openings for LPO positions and restricted those to E-6 pay grades, it could allow the 
Navy to select and keep the highest-performing production recruiters. 
Furthermore, there was a slight difference in recruiter productivity between some 
ratings that required higher cognitive ability and some ratings with lower cognitive 




Due to the large number of observations lost during the data merging 
process, further research is recommended to fully quantify the cost of a rating screening 
process and understanding the differences in cognitive ability, the different cultures of 
each rating, and their correlation to recruiting performance. 
CNRC and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) should conduct further 
research by including the recruiter’s full SSN to the NORU data file. This would allow a 
majority of the observations to be successfully merged together. A detailed analysis, 
using four years of available data capturing the recruiter’s performance at NORU and the 
recruiter’s productivity during a three-year recruiting tour, would be recommended for 
further analysis. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Navy enlisted recruiting is a challenging job that is unique and important to the 
vital missions carried out by the Navy. In a budget-constrained environment, it is 
important that research be continued for finding new ways of improving recruiter 
productivity. 
1. Effects of Demographics on Recruiter Productivity 
This study primarily focused on the effects of cognitive skills on recruiter 
productivity. Obviously, there are many other contributing factors that might explain or 
help to predict individual recruiter productivity. Future research could include recruiter 
demographics such as race, gender, ASVAB scores, level of education completed, marital 
status, number of years served, and age. The results could help to identify certain 
demographics that may lead to higher productivity. 
2. Enlisted Recruiter Selection 
Future research could include capturing more observations merged from the 
PRIDE and NORU data files to validate the differences between recruiter rating 
productivity. The results could be used to help determine enlisted Navy recruiter 
selection. 
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3. ENRO Course Reduction 
Over the course of this study, it was noted that several of the same topics were 
taught at NORU and during NRD indoctrination. According to some of the interviewed 
CANRECs, they felt that the NORU course could be shortened by a week, as they had 
just completed their basic PQS requirements, had been exposed to other experienced 
recruiters, and noticed some similarities between indoctrination/BRM PQS and the 
ENRO course taught at NORU. It is possible that the ENRO course could be shortened 
by eliminating the overlapping areas that are taught and completed during indoctrination. 
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APPENDIX A. ENLISTED NAVY RECRUITING ORIENTATION 
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